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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan II
retired within a week of one another, and by the end of 1971 both were
dead. Their departure from the Supreme Court was momentous in several
ways. In a real sense, it marked the end of the Warren Court. In the two
terms since Chief Justice Earl Warren stepped down, the Court had largely
maintained the decisional trajectory set under Warren. Once President
Richard Nixon filled almost half its seats, the emergence of a distinctive
Burger Court was inevitable. But the fact that it was Black and Harlan who
were gone profoundly affected the nature of the new era.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions in the preceding
decade had reflected a coherent constitutional vision. In particular, on
62
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issues involving race, voting rights, criminal procedure, and the First
Amendment, the Court almost invariably arrived at “liberal” outcomes
reflecting the majority’s commitment to an egalitarian and libertarian
understanding of the Constitution’s substance.1 Justice Black usually agreed
with the outcomes, while Justice Harlan was a frequent dissenter, but
together they played a vital role. Their colleagues often seemed almost
cavalier about the details in the reasoning the Court gave for its decisions,
but Black and Harlan shared a fierce commitment to the proposition that
what matters in constitutional adjudication is not just the result but, equally,
the methods of constitutional reasoning used in reaching the decision. To be
sure, they were at odds over the correct methods, with Black insisting that
constitutional law is fixed by textual meaning and Harlan defending the role
in constitutional law of “the common-law approach to legal development.”2
But as long as they were on the Court, they jointly championed the
importance of reasoning and not just results.
After Black and Harlan left, most of the justices discarded the
substantive vision driving the Warren era majority, but they also abandoned
the concern for judicial method that Black and Harlan shared.3 The result
was a Court committed to the exercise of power by shifting majorities but
serving no coherent understanding of the Constitution and disciplined by no
* Professor of Law, Duke University. I am deeply indebted to Henry
Monaghan, Barry Sullivan, and James Boyd White for the close and generous
readings they gave this article. Many thanks to them, and also to Charles Fried and
Sara Powell for their comments and encouragement, and to my wife Sarah who, as
always, took time away from her own busy professional work to think about mine.
1. For the most part, the Warren Court justices were spared the difficulties
that arise when egalitarianism and libertarianism collide. In his great Harvard Law
Review “Foreword,” Professor Charles Fried, who clerked for Justice Harlan
during the October Term 1960 (in which Poe v. Ullman was decided), observed
that “the Warren Court transformation did have a core coherence that few on the
Court, in the bar, or in the country wanted to do without. It was not a theory, but it
was a promise: that the Constitution of the United States somewhere, somehow,
provided a basis for holding back the most palpable abuses and indecencies of
organized government.” Fried immediately added that “[n]o one said this better
than Justice Harlan” despite his frequent dissents, and quoted Harlan’s Poe dissent
to demonstrate that assertion. Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
13, 74 (1995). I agree with Fried about the Warren Court’s fundamental orientation
and about Harlan’s role as an internal critic rather than a simple outsider.
2. John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function
in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943 (1963), reprinted in THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY 289, 292 (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969). On Black’s views, see
generally HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968).
3. The most junior of Nixon’s appointees, then-Associate Justice William
Rehnquist, had a coherent constitutional vision very different in substance from the
Warren Court’s, but Rehnquist was eclectic in the means he adopted to pursue it.
See Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91
YALE L.J. 1317, 1318 (1982).
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principled methods of reasoning.4 Our current, lamentably politicized
practices of federal judicial selection and block voting on the appellate
courts have their origin, in part, in what the Supreme Court became after
Black and Harlan left. Perhaps it is time, on the fiftieth anniversary of their
departure, to consider what Black and Harlan may have to teach us.
In this article, I consider Justice Harlan’s understanding of how we
should go about addressing constitutional law questions through the lens of
his elaborate dissent in Poe v. Ullman, decided in 1961.5 In Poe, a bare
majority of the justices declined to rule on the constitutionality of a
Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraception as applied to
married persons.6 Black and Harlan were two of the dissenters, with Black
merely noting that he “believe[d] that the constitutional questions should be
reached and decided.”7 Harlan, on the other hand, filed a substantial, twopart opinion that addressed both the justiciability of the suit and the validity
of the statute, which Harlan concluded was a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment due process at least with respect to a married couple.8 I focus
on Harlan’s Poe opinion because it was his most elaborate discussion of his
general views on constitutional adjudication. And I focus on Harlan rather
than Black because in my view, Harlan’s perspective is the less well
known, or at least the less well understood. Black’s constitutional
textualism is, rhetorically and to some extent substantively, very similar to
the methodological position the late Justice Antonin Scalia articulated. It
would be difficult to fully explore Black’s contemporary relevance without
discussing Scalia as well, and to do that in addition to explaining Harlan’s
4. Professor Vincent Blasi famously described the Burger Court as
characterized by “rootless activism.” See Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of
the Burger Court (1986), in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN’T 198, 199, 200-01, 205, 208 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
5. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522–55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. I briefly discuss the views expressed by the plurality and concurring
opinions in note 13 and Section I.F, infra.
7. Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
8. Justice Douglas’s dissent, like Harlan’s, discussed both justiciability and
the merits. In a three-sentence opinion, Justice Stewart stated that he agreed with
Douglas’s and Harlan’s discussions of justiciability and added that “in refraining
from a discussion of the constitutional issues,” he did not imply that he would
disagree with them on the statute’s invalidity. Id. at 555 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, Stewart concluded that Douglas and
Harlan were wrong and the statute was constitutional, perhaps because he thought
that in the interim the Court had definitively rejected substantive due process. See
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167–68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In 1963,
this Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 727, purported to sound the death knell
for the doctrine of substantive due process . . . [but] it was clear to me . . . [in 1965]
that the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the
Connecticut statute substantively invaded the ‘liberty’ that is protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
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views would expand this article into a book. In any event, as the reader will
soon discover, to write about Harlan is necessarily to write about Black as
well, so the latter will not be ignored.9
The article begins with a detailed examination of Harlan’s dissent
in Poe v. Ullman. In this first section, I discuss the account Harlan gives of
constitutional adjudication, his justification for his understanding of due
process, and his application of that understanding to analyze, and ultimately
reject, the constitutionality of the state law. I show that Harlan identified his
approach to due process adjudication as a specific example of the general
approach to constitutional decision making to which Chief Justice John
Marshall gave canonical expression in McCulloch v. Maryland. By doing
so, Harlan clearly implied that it was his view of constitutional decision
making, not Black’s, that truly respects the text of the Constitution.
Harlan’s disagreement with Black thus was an argument over how the
written Constitution is properly understood and enforced, not—as Black
claimed—a debate between an approach obedient to the authoritative text
and a view of constitutional law that wrongly transforms judges into
lawmakers.
This first section of the article asks the reader to engage with me in
a very close reading of Harlan’s opinion. I consider in detail Harlan’s
arguments, the intellectual debates that were the context of his views, and
the implications of the particular cases he cites. I recognize that some
readers may find the detail tedious at times, but I ask their forbearance.
Harlan’s painstaking attention to details is an essential aspect of his respect
for history and precedent that balances his reliance on overarching themes
in analyzing constitutional questions. I also attempt to avoid the
anachronism of reading back into Harlan’s opinion what later justices and
commentators have made of it, and I ask the reader to do the same.10 We
cannot truly give Harlan a rehearing unless we first allow him to speak in
his terms, not ours.
This sort of close reading, I think, is key to understanding Harlan’s
opinion and, more broadly, to evaluating the understanding of constitutional
law—what he called “the rational process in constitutional adjudication”—
that Harlan advocated and employed in Poe. Harlan argued that the
Constitution is the basic charter of our society and contains broad principles
of government, not simply narrow rules susceptible to what John Hart Ely
9. In addition, I am co-author of a book arguing for Black’s relevance to
contemporary law in the area of the First Amendment. See DAVID L. LANGE & H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 241–42 (2009).
10. For similar reasons I generally do not rely on opinions that Harlan wrote
after Poe and Griswold. I think Harlan’s views on constitutional decision making
were broadly consistent over time. This article’s concern is not with Harlan’s
decisions as a whole but with the particular approach he set out in Poe and
amplified in one important respect in Griswold.
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once labeled “clause-bound interpretivism.”11 Because the Constitution is
this kind of governing instrument, constitutional adjudication demands the
exercise of a degree of individual judgment in order to determine what the
Constitution requires. In doing so, judges are fulfilling rather than
ignoring—as Black charged—their duty to base their constitutional
decisions on the requirements of the Constitution because the real
Constitution is not Black’s imagined collection of discrete rules but a
statement of fundamental principles. Through their engagement in a
meticulous consideration of precedent and of the arguments in past
constitutional debates, and by reasoning from broad principles to the
particular issue before the court, judges remain within the legitimate scope
of their authority.
The second section of the article discusses Harlan’s concurrence in
Griswold v. Connecticut, the 1965 decision in which the Court, with Black
dissenting, held that the contraception statute at issue in Poe could not be
constitutionally applied to married persons. Harlan’s chief concern, I
explain, was to answer Black’s charge that a position like Harlan’s licenses
improperly subjective decision making by judges. According to Harlan,
Black’s position does not in fact achieve the goal that supposedly justifies
it—the prevention of such illegitimate subjectivity. In contrast, a judge
following Harlan’s approach will necessarily exercise an appropriately
constrained legal judgment.
In the final section of the article, I argue that we should grant
Harlan a rehearing on three themes he develops in his Poe and Griswold
opinions. First, we should consider whether Harlan was right that all
approaches to constitutional adjudication—such as Black’s—that attempt to
eliminate the role of personal judgment are fundamentally flawed.
Conversely, we ought to ask whether Harlan made a convincing case for his
“rational process” as a legitimate form of judicial decision making rooted in
American constitutional tradition. Finally, we should take seriously
Harlan’s portrayal of constitutional law as an ongoing conversation rather
than a series of legal battles. My answer on each point is that Harlan is
persuasive. His open consideration of broad themes in our constitutional
tradition, his respectful and intellectually honest use of precedent, and his
insistence that individual decisions focus on the details of the particular
case before the Court invite similarly open responses from colleagues and
11. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 12–13 (1980) (defining “clause-bound interpretivism” as the view that “the
various provisions of the Constitution be approached essentially as self-contained
units and interpreted on the basis of their language, with whatever interpretive help
the legislative history can provide, without significant injection of content from
outside the provision.”). Professor Ely was perhaps hesitant about applying the
term to Justice Black, I think unnecessarily so. It would doubtless be wrong to
attribute to Black “a historically straitjacketed literalism,” id. at 2, but all that
proves, I think, is that Black was a smart lawyer.
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critics. If we allow him a rehearing, I believe we will conclude that Harlan
has much to contribute to contemporary constitutional law.
I.

THE BASIC CHARTER OF OUR SOCIETY: POE V. ULLMAN

A. The Intellectual Context of Justice Harlan’s Dissent
Arguably, Justice Harlan’s most famous opinion was the dissent he
wrote, speaking for himself alone, in the Supreme Court’s first important
contraceptives case, Poe v. Ullman, decided in 1961.12 Poe combined
appeals from declaratory judgment actions brought in state court by a
married couple, a married woman, and a physician, all seeking to invalidate
a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives, at least as
applied to married persons. The state supreme court upheld the statute, but
in the United States Supreme Court a bare majority voted to dismiss the
appeals as non-justiciable.13 Justice Harlan wrote a carefully crafted opinion
that not only rebutted the arguments against reaching the merits, but went
on to conclude that the statute’s application to a married person or her
doctor would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.14
The Poe dissent has proven to have a long afterlife. Although
Harlan once again spoke for himself alone when the Court struck down the
Connecticut contraceptives ban as to married persons in Griswold v.
Connecticut,15 in subsequent cases the Court has relied on his Poe

12. Poe, 367 U.S. at 522–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Twice before the
Supreme Court refused to address the merits of a challenge to a contraception ban,
the second involving the same Connecticut statute. See Gardner v. Massachusetts,
305 U.S. 559 (1938) (dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question);
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (dismissing appeal because physician
plaintiff lacked standing).
13. Justice Frankfurter concluded for a plurality that “we cannot accept, as the
basis of constitutional adjudication, other than as chimerical the fear of
enforcement of provisions that have during so many years gone uniformly and
without exception unenforced.” Poe, 367 U.S. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., plurality
opinion). Justice Brennan agreed, in an opinion as brief and opaque as
Frankfurter’s was labored and opaque, that the appeals “must be dismissed for
failure to present a real and substantial controversy.” Id. at 509 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). I consider the justiciability debate in subsection I.F.
14. Harlan explained his unusual decision to discuss a constitutional question
that the Court had not reached: “such issues, as I see things, are entangled with the
Court’s conclusion as to the nonjusticiability of these appeals.” Id. at 524 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499–502 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Harlan’s brief opinion cited the “reasons [he] stated at
length” in Poe and responded to the argument about judicial restraint Black
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analysis.16 Even justices unenthusiastic about what they perceive to be its
implications have acknowledged that Harlan’s Poe opinion has been
influential.17 But the opinion’s fame—or notoriety—may stand in the way
of understanding, sixty years after Justice Harlan wrote it, the Poe dissent’s
deepest lessons. Therefore, in reading what follows in sections I and II of
this article, the reader should put to one side what later justices have made
of Harlan’s opinion. In particular, it will be useful to resist the temptation to
categorize the Poe dissent as presenting a “substantive due process”
argument. While the opinion does indeed locate the state law’s invalidity in
its violation of substantive constitutional limitations imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, the term “substantive due
process” itself has acquired so much baggage that it is a hindrance rather
than a help in attempting to understand Harlan’s 1961 opinion.18 For that
advanced in his Griswold dissent. Id. at 500–02 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment). I discuss this debate between Harlan and Black in section II below.
16. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor,
Kennedy, & Souter, J.J., at this point for the Court) (“[T]he Court adopted
[Harlan’s Poe] position four Terms later in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . .”);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982). The Casey quotation reflects the
interesting fact that the original opinion of the Court in Griswold has essentially
dropped out of analytical use: the Casey joint opinion relies heavily on Harlan’s
Poe dissent but makes no substantive use of Douglas’s opinion other than to imply,
inaccurately, that Douglas relied on “the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause” in discussing marital privacy. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (citing Griswold, 381
U.S at 481–82)).
17. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
“Justice Harlan’s influential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman” did not support
the majority’s analysis); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 n.17 (1997)
(quarreling with a concurrence’s reliance on the Poe dissent while conceding that
“Justice Harlan's opinion has often been cited in due process cases”).
18. In contemporary usage “substantive due process” is the usual way to refer
to the inquiry whether one of the due process clauses forbids a governmental action
(legislative or executive) because it impermissibly infringes a substantive liberty
interest, and is contrasted with “procedural due process,” which requires
government to afford someone adequate procedures before depriving him or her of
life, liberty or property. The phrase is inelegant, and occurs in Supreme Court
opinions very rarely before the 1970s.
I am aware of only two opinions in which Justice Harlan employed the phrase,
in both instances with negative connotations. In the earlier, Harlan observed that
the requirement, since repealed, that a suit to enjoin a state statute be heard by a
three-judge district court originated in congressional “ire [over] the frequent grants
of injunctions against the enforcement of progressive state regulatory legislation,
usually on substantive due process grounds.” See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 127 (1965). In the later opinion, Harlan expressly distinguished the
freedom of contract doctrine, for which he preferred to reserve the term
“substantive due process,” from the constitutional methodology he advocated in
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reason, I will use the term Harlan preferred, “due process,” to refer to the
mode of analysis he commended in Poe.
The key jurisprudential background to the Poe dissent lay in the
Supreme Court’s rejection a quarter century before of the early twentieth
century freedom of contract cases, often referred to collectively by the
name of the most famous, Lochner v. New York.19 The New Deal critique of
Lochner had several distinct elements, which various critics on and off the
Court weighted differently. The simplest focused on the fact that the
freedom of contract cases invoked the word “liberty” in the due process
clauses as the doctrine’s basis in the Constitution’s language. Reviving the
old textual argument that Justice Brandeis had thought persuasive in
principle, critics sometimes argued that a requirement of due process of law
doesn’t speak to the substance of the law at all.20 The due process clauses
simply can’t do the work that the freedom of contract doctrine needed them
to do.
Another objection to Lochner took Justice Holmes’s famous dissent
in that case as its lodestar. Holmes’s objection was not to freedom of
contract’s inadequate textual basis. In his dissent he indicated that the Court
could legitimately invalidate a statute that might fairly be said to “infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of
our people and our law.” His concern was with the source of the doctrine,
which he thought based on a contested “economic theory” rather than on
American legal or cultural traditions. Holmes believed it was clear from the
pervasive limitations on contractual freedom that the “Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism . . . or of laissez faire.” The Lochner decisions thus were rooted
not in a proper source of constitutional law but in the personal “convictions

Poe. “Under the rubric of ‘equal protection’ this Court has in recent times
effectively substituted its own ‘enlightened’ social philosophy for that of the
legislature no less than did in the older days the judicial adherents of the now
discredited doctrine of ‘substantive’ due process. I, for one, would prefer to judge
the legislation before us in this case in terms of due process, that is to determine
whether it arbitrarily infringes a constitutionally protected interest of this appellant.
Due process, as I noted in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, is more than
merely a procedural safeguard; it is also a ‘bulwark . . . against arbitrary
legislation.’” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted).
19. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”)
(emphasis added), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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or prejudices” of the judges, even if the mistake was inadvertent, the
product of intellectual confusion rather than conscious mendacity.21
The Court, at least as seen in retrospect, signaled its repudiation of
Lochner freedom of contract in 1937, and by February 1941, there were no
sitting justices who thought freedom of contract is a fundamental
constitutional value.22 The reconstituted Court was unanimous in agreeing
with Holmes that Lochner’s protection of contractual freedom was a
mistake, and some of the justices explained how the old Court had gone
wrong in terms of mistaken constitutional method. Justice Felix Frankfurter
thought that the Court had been right to assume that “[i]n each case” the
due process clauses put a duty on the courts to engage in “the detached
consideration of conflicting claims.” Frankfurter thought the error in
Lochner was the Court’s selection of which claims to vindicate.23 Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone accepted the legitimacy of due process
challenges on substantive grounds, but thought such challenges ordinarily
should be evaluated against a strong presumption that legislation is
constitutional. For Stone, the Lochner mistake lay in concluding without
21. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Harlan agreed with
Holmes that the freedom of contract doctrine resulted from the Justices’ uncritical
adoption of contestable, extra-legal social or economic ideas. See, e.g.,
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 382
(1969) (Lochner era “economic due process . . . was based on self-mesmerized
views of economic and social theory”) (citations omitted).
22. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (a freedom of contract
precedent)). Justice James C. McReynolds, the last adherent to the pre-1937
doctrine, retired early in 1941.
23. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“[I]n considering what interests are so fundamental as to be enshrined
in the Due Process Clause, those liberties of the individual which history has
attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come
to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.”). Frankfurter was
much readier to find a violation of due process when executive officers offended
his “‘sense of justice’” than when the Court was asked to reject the rationality of
the legislative judgment embodied in a statute, even if the law was arguably a
“legislative invasion” of “freedom of expression.” Compare Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court), with Kovacs, 336 U.S. at
95 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261–
64 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (upholding a state group libel statute:
while the due process clause authorizes the Court “to nullify action which
encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel,” “we would
deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking
ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups [because]
it would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of
policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem”).
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adequate justification that the presumption had been overcome.24 By the
mid-1950s, the Court’s decisions generally followed Stone in adjudicating
substantive due process claims by applying an almost toothless form of
“rational basis” scrutiny.25
Justice Black eventually settled on a different and more radical
critique of Lochner. What if the enterprise of identifying constitutional
principles not clearly expressed in constitutional text is itself impossible,
and any attempt to carry it out inevitably results in the judges invalidating
whatever offends their political and moral sensibilities? Over the course of
the 1940s, Justice Black had come to this conclusion, and he adopted his
strongly text-centered approach as the only defensible method of
constitutional decision making.26 The Constitution is its text, and
24. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(Stone, J.) (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known
or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators”). But as he suggested in the famous footnote four in Carolene
Products, Stone did not think “the operation of the presumption of
constitutionality” had to be invariant across types of due process claims. Id. at n.4.
See also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942)
(Stone, C.J., concurring) (“There are limits to the extent to which the presumption
of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is
concerned”) (citation omitted).
25. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). Justice
Black viewed even rationality review under the due process clauses as illegitimate
in principle, but neither he nor his colleagues were much troubled by the theoretical
inconsistency between a nominal inquiry into a law’s rationality and Black’s
outright rejection of substantive review under the due process clauses. Compare
Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (explaining, in an opinion of the Court Black joined,
that “[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”),
with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (opinion of the Court by Black,
J., purporting to disavow the use of the due process clause “to strike down laws
which [are] thought unreasonable”). See also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 673–74 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (acknowledging rationality
review under the equal protection clause). Justice Harlan was unwilling to overlook
the methodological inconsistency and declined to join Black’s Ferguson opinion.
See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Off. of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 325–26 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) (“There is a strong
emotional appeal in the words ‘fair play’, ‘justice’, and ‘reasonableness.’ But they
were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or
Federal laws passed by elected legislative representatives. . . . [A]pplication of this
natural law concept, whether under the terms ‘reasonableness’, ‘justice’, or ‘fair
play’, makes judges the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices.”). At
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constitutional law is by definition the exegesis of that text and its
meaning.27 Furthermore, by limiting judicial review to the enforcement of
norms demonstrably embedded in the text of the Constitution, courts could
avoid the “intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value
judgments.”28 Courts that depart from the text of specific constitutional
prohibitions leave the scope of individual rights and governmental authority
alike at the mercy of individual judges’ personal views of justice.29 The
creation of norms is the business of the people in constitution-making and
of the legislature in ordinary lawmaking. For Black, judges are normenforcers only.30
this early point in Black’s development of his textualist approach, he was also
willing to concede that judicial enforcement of specific, express prohibitions
“requires interpretation, and interpretation, it is true, may result in extension of the
Constitution’s purpose.” Id. at 325. At a later stage even this ambiguous admission
of doctrinal development was muted or disappeared.
27. As Black later put it, individual constitutional rights are defined by
“constitutional guarantees, both explicit and necessarily implied from explicit
language.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 407 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
28. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729. Black went on to quote Holmes that “‘Courts
should be careful not to extend [express constitutional] prohibitions beyond their
obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the
particular Court may happen to entertain.’” Id. (quoting Tyson & Brother v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
29. See, e.g., Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 378 (1963)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he more precise words of the Fifth Amendment . . . are
a far more certain safeguard against the use of compelled confessions than the
tractable and pliable protections which the Court may or may not afford under the
due process ‘shock the conscience’ test”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175
(1952) (Black, J., concurring) (“[F]aithful adherence to the specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than
that which can be afforded by the nebulous [due process] standards stated by the
majority.”); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S., 46, 83 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(under Lochner-style due process “the power of legislatures [becomes] what this
Court would declare it to be at a particular time independently of the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”).
30. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania., 380 U.S. 693, 703
(1965) (Black, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree that because we ourselves might
believe the practice of obtaining evidence in that manner ‘shocks the conscience’ or
is ‘shabby’ or ‘arbitrary,’ we are commanded or even authorized by the
Constitution to prevent its use as evidence. That seems to me to be amending the
Constitution, which is the business of the people, not interpreting it, which is the
business of the courts.”); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 91–92 (Black, J., dissenting)
(quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 601
n.4 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., concurring) (“In the one instance,
courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute
policies written into the Constitution; in the other they roam at will in the limitless
area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, a
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But this new textualism31 appeared to come with a price. Black’s
disavowal of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause as a
substantive limitation put the Court’s precedents protecting freedom of
speech, press, and religion against state and local government in jeopardy.
Black had come to approve strongly of those precedents, but they originated
in the application of the same due process logic employed in Lochner and
the other freedom of contract decisions.32 Once Black had fully developed
his textualist understanding of constitutional adjudication, from his
perspective, the state free speech cases could not be justified by Lochnerian
reasoning. But by 1949, Black had found a solution to this conundrum. The
Fourteenth Amendment, he explained, had been intended to “incorporate”
(apply against the states) all the provisions of the first eight amendments.33
Black’s original purpose argument for “total incorporation” never
responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of
the people.”)).
31. I am going to use the term “textualism” as shorthand for Justice Black’s
understanding of constitutional decision making although, as the reader will see,
Justice Harlan insisted that his very different approach was the path of true fidelity
to the Constitution’s text.
32. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943)
(Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). Black’s first important opinion in the area
explicitly analyzed the issue before the Court by “‘weigh[ing] the circumstances
and apprais[ing] the reasons’” for the limitation of press and religious freedom
under review. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (quoting Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)). Black’s conclusion that the Court should
uphold the press and religious freedom claims thus rested on a straightforward
application of Lochner-era logic, with those freedoms substituted for freedom of
contract as constitutional values entitled to searching judicial protection. See
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509 (“When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we
must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy
a preferred position.”) Black soon realized that such reasoning was inconsistent
with his rejection of Lochner as a method, and by the time Poe was decided,
Marsh’s language of balancing conflicting constitutional interests was anathema to
him. The total incorporation theory preserved Marsh’s result while breaking the
methodological connection to Lochner.
33. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting). Black’s
incorporation theory is logically independent of his textualism. On its face,
moreover, total incorporation seems difficult to justify as an interpretation of the
words “due process of law.” Black would later suggest what seems to me a
plausible argument that his specific Fourteenth Amendment theory was consistent
with his general textualism when understood as a construction of the privileges or
immunities clause. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he words ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ seem to me an
eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights
shall apply to the States.”).

74

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 1

persuaded a majority of the Court, but the symmetry and apparent
simplicity of equating Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment liberties
influenced even justices unwilling to subscribe entirely to Black’s theory.34
And justices unwilling to embrace Black’s textualism nonetheless strove to
distinguish their reasoning from that of the Lochner era in vindicating
substantive claims to “liberty.”35
In Poe v. Ullman, in contrast, Harlan took exactly the opposite
approach. Adjudication of substantive claims to liberty under the due
process clauses—Lochner’s method if not its particular outcome—is a
34. On the same day the Court decided Poe, it held in Mapp v. Ohio that the
exclusionary rule long applied where the federal government violated the Fourth
Amendment should apply equally to unreasonable state searches in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. “Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is
used against the Federal Government.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Justice Harlan dissented. Id. at 672. From Mapp on, the Court regularly treated
those liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause that
paralleled freedoms protected by the first eight amendments against federal
interference as co-extensive with their Bill of Rights counterparts. By the time
Black and Harlan left the Court, this process of selective incorporation had resulted
in the incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment of the vast majority of
provisions in the Bill of Rights, although the Court continued to determine whether
the specific right at issue was incorporated by asking whether it was “fundamental”
in some sense rather simply by observing, with Black, that the right is protected by
the Bill of Rights. See Duncan, 391 U.S. 148–50, n.14 (discussing the “variety of
ways” in which the Court had expressed the inquiry). Black cheerfully accepted
these decisions as vindications in practice of the total incorporation theory to which
he continued to adhere. See, e.g., id. at 171 (Black, J., concurring) (“I believe as
strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States. I have been willing to support the selective
incorporation doctrine, however, as an alternative [because], most importantly for
me, the selective incorporation process has the virtue of having already worked to
make most of the Bill of Rights’ protections applicable to the States.”). Harlan
consistently objected to even a partial adoption of Black’s incorporation reasoning.
See, e.g., id. at 179 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (in decisions holding that Fourteenth
Amendment due process protects a liberty also protected by a Bill of Rights
provision, “[t]he logically critical [factor] was not that the rights had been found in
the Bill of Rights, but that they were deemed, in the context of American legal
history, to be fundamental”). For Harlan’s discussion of incorporation in Poe, see
below.
35. In Poe for example, Justice Douglas concluded that the Connecticut
statute violated the due process clause as well as the First Amendment. See Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513–15 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But Douglas
expressly denied that he was following Lochner, id. at 517, and indicated that the
liberty interest he thought protected was closely linked to express provisions in the
Bill of Rights. See id. (“‘Liberty’ is a conception that sometimes gains content from
the emanations of other specific guarantees”).
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paradigm example of legitimate constitutional decision-making, not the
dangerous, suspect, or even outright illegitimate tool that his colleagues
feared. A court should decide an issue of constitutional law, when the
correct outcome is not dictated by precedent, through a “rational process”
that requires the judges to determine what overarching constitutional
principles and which aspects of constitutional history are relevant to the
question before the court. In doing so, each judge must interpret the scope
and significance of precedent, evaluate conflicting arguments, and
determine which decision will be the most consistent with American
constitutional tradition taken as a whole. These are not tasks, Harlan
thought, that can be performed simply by a semantic inquiry into the
meaning of a constitutional provision, or a value-free historical
investigation of its origins. Instead, they require the individual judge to
reach conclusions about persuasiveness and analogy that involve the
exercise of that individual’s personal judgment—what I shall call normative
judgment. Certainly, as Black insisted, a court does not sit to tell us its
members’ private judgments on what they think is just. At the same time,
on difficult constitutional questions, the Court’s members have no
alternative than to tell us their personal judgments on what they think the
law of the Constitution requires.
The broadest and most important aspect of the Poe dissent lies here.
At the heart of textualism lay Black’s claim that in order to decide a
constitutional issue legitimately, the judge must ordinarily36 avoid the
intrusion of his personal viewpoints into his analysis of the meaning of
constitutional language and its applicability to the facts before the court. In
contrast, according to Harlan, an approach to constitutional decision
making—such as Black’s textualism—that denies the inevitability, and the
propriety, of personal, normative judgment in constitutional law is
indefensibly wrong-headed. Far from being the original or authentic form
of constitutional adjudication, textualism misunderstands the constitutional
text and misidentifies the role of the constitutional judge. Harlan’s
audacious claim in Poe is that the due process analysis he presented there,
with its unequivocal affirmation that judges can and must make normative
judgments in coming to constitutional decisions, represents the authentic
form of constitutional adjudication in the tradition of McCulloch v.
Maryland, the true path of fidelity to the written Constitution.

36. For Black’s slightly different view of the Fourth Amendment, see below at
note 53.
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B. A Framework of Constitutional Principles
Justice Harlan began his discussion of the merits in Poe v. Ullman37
by deliberately underlining the role of his personal, normative judgment in
his constitutional analysis.
I consider that this Connecticut legislation, as construed to
apply to these appellants, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. I believe that a statute making it a criminal
offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the
conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's
personal life.38
It is difficult to imagine a more pointed challenge to a
constitutional lawyer such as Justice Black, who believed that legitimate
constitutional adjudication depends on the adoption of a methodology that
denies any role to the judge’s own normative evaluations. In contrast,
Harlan left the reader with no doubt that his constitutional conclusion was
the product, in part, of a personal judgment rather than an impersonal
calculus—“I consider . . . I believe” —and that his judgment depended in
part on a weighing of competing normative considerations—“intolerable
and unjustifiable”—rather than a neutral, value-free interpretation of
constitutional language.
For Black, Harlan’s characterization of his conclusion in Poe
amounted to a confession that the conclusion stemmed from Harlan’s
commission of the cardinal judicial sin of allowing his personal policy
preferences—or in Holmes’s Lochner phrase, his “convictions or
prejudices”—to drive his thinking. As Black explained this viewpoint a few
years later in Griswold, “I do not believe that we are granted power by the
Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to
measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose. . . . The
power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body.”39
Clearly, Justice Harlan was aware that he was inviting the charge of
following the Lochner-era justices in substituting his personal preferences
for the judgment of the legislature. The accusation, obviously, would be all
the more plausible from Black’s perspective, in that Harlan made no claim
37. Below, in section I.F, I discuss the first part of Harlan’s dissent, which
addressed the justiciability of the case. For our purposes, we can see the
significance of his discussion of justiciability more readily if we examine his
discussion of the merits first.
38. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 512–13 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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that either the constitutional text or Supreme Court precedent expressly
mandated his judgment on the Connecticut statute. For these reasons,
Harlan introduced his substantive discussion of the statute’s validity with a
defense of due process analysis that turned criticisms like Black’s upside
down. According to Harlan, the logical structure of due process as a method
is the logic of all constitutional law. It expresses “the framework of
Constitutional principles” that should govern all legitimate constitutional
adjudication.40
Harlan began by taking note of a structural principle that limits the
role of the judiciary in reviewing state legislation for its compatibility with
the Constitution of the United States. The national Constitution is not the
source of state legislative powers, and from a federal constitutional-law
standpoint, a state law is valid unless it runs afoul of a prohibition imposed
by the Constitution.41 “Only to the extent that the Constitution so requires
may this Court interfere with the exercise of this plenary power of
government.”42 Harlan’s view of constitutional adjudication thus shared a
common background assumption with Black’s, specifically, that judicial
review is not some general power to supervise the activities of state
governments, but is limited to the enforcement of legal principles properly
grounded in the Constitution.43 But from that assumption on, Harlan’s Poe
40. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Since [the arguments he
would go on to address] draw their basis from no explicit language of the
Constitution, and have yet to find expression in any decision of this Court, I feel it
desirable at the outset to state the framework of Constitutional principles in which I
think the issue must be judged.”).
41. Id. (“In reviewing state legislation, whether considered to be in the
exercise of the State’s police powers, or in provision for the health, safety, morals
or welfare of its people, it is clear that what is concerned are ‘the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty.’”) (quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.)). I am not certain what
distinction (if any) Harlan intended to draw between a state’s police powers and its
authority to legislate “for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people.” Id.
The important points are that as a general matter, state legislatures derive their
powers from the respective state constitutions and that the affirmative scope of
those powers is undefined. The states’ authority with respect to some aspects of
federal elections and the Article V amendment process, in contrast, is delegated by
the federal Constitution and thus is an exception to the general principles Harlan
invoked. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995)
(“[I]n certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the federal
system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the
Constitution.”).
42. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393–94 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (denying that the Supreme Court has “‘unlimited authority
to supervise all assertions of state and federal power . . . .’”) (quoting Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 271 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting)). In Boddie, in an
opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
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dissent outlined an account of constitutional law radically different from
Black’s textualism.
The next sentence in Harlan’s account of his “framework of
Constitutional principles” is rich with meaning but its central message is
that any attempt to eliminate normative judgment from constitutional
decision making is unworkable, illegitimate, and at odds with the
mainstream judicial tradition.
But precisely because it is the Constitution alone which
warrants judicial interference in sovereign operations of the
State, the basis of judgment as to the Constitutionality of
state action must be a rational one, approaching the text
which is the only commission for our power not in a
literalistic way, as if we had a tax statute before us, but as
the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare but
meaningful terms the principles of government.44
Let us begin by considering Harlan’s assertion that “the basis of
judgment . . . must be a rational one,” which he echoed in his next sentence
by referring to “the rational process in Constitutional adjudication.”45 The
adjective “rational” that I just emphasized was not a reference to the
platitude that judges should avoid elementary logical errors. It was instead
shorthand for a deliberate and provocative assertion that the courts can and
must make constitutional decisions by reasoning through the exercise, in
part, of normative judgment, a basis for decision that someone like Black
thought entirely extra-judicial. Harlan’s choice of words makes his
deliberate challenge to Black clear. Over time, to be sure, Black had used a
variety of phrases to describe the employment of normative judgment that
he rejected as the usurpation of legislative authority.46 Only a year before
Poe, however, Black and Harlan had clashed over their conflicting views of
judicial inquiry into the validity of state legislation using the language of
rationality.
Flemming v. Nestor, which Harlan wrote for the Court, upheld a
provision of the Social Security Act against a variety of constitutional
attacks brought by a claimant whose benefits were terminated after he had
due process clause invalidated a court fee requirement that precluded indigent
persons from seeking a divorce. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382-83.
44. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539–40 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
45. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
46. In a footnote in his Griswold dissent, Black provided an extensive list of
the phrases he thought had been used to express this error. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (cataloging “the
catchwords and catch phrases invoked by judges who would strike down under the
Fourteenth Amendment laws which offend their notions of natural justice . . . .”).
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been lawfully deported because he had been a member of the Communist
Party years before. Harlan concluded that the provision requiring
termination did not violate the Fifth Amendment due process clause
because it was not “so lacking in rational justification as to
offend due process.”47 Harlan’s rationale was, in part, that there was a
logical connection between the goals of the Social Security Act and
terminating payments to someone no longer eligible to reside in the United
States.48 But Harlan also explained it could not “be deemed irrational for
Congress to have concluded that the public purse should not be utilized to
contribute to the support of those deported on the grounds specified in the
statute.”49 That part of the reasoning was not a matter of logical relationship
but of normative acceptability. Harlan and his colleagues in the majority did
not think it was unconstitutional oppression for Congress to deny Social
Security benefits to supporters and former supporters of Communism.50
Black dissented because he thought the statutory provision violated
several different constitutional provisions.51 Black also explained at some
length that the appellee had failed to present a cognizable due process claim
at all, rather than simply (as Harlan thought) that the claim was
unpersuasive. Black denounced “the Court's assumption of [a] power to
hold Acts unconstitutional because the Court thinks they are arbitrary and
irrational [on the ground that such a decision can] be neither more nor less
than a judicial foray into the field of governmental policy.” For the Court to
inquire into the rationality of a statute, Black asserted, was to enter a “field”
of decision “with no standards except its own conclusion as to what is
‘arbitrary’ and what is ‘rational.’” Stepping away from a rigorous
adherence to the constitutional text, according to Black, empowers the
Court both to invalidate laws that violate no constitutional prohibition for
reasons “wholly dependent upon this Court's idea of what is ‘arbitrary’ and
‘rational,’” and equally to uphold laws “on the ground that they are neither

47. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
48. Id. (Harlan reasoned that Social Security benefits the economy by
increasing the “over-all national purchasing power” and that “[t]his advantage
would be lost as to payments made to one residing overseas.”).
49. Id.
50. Harlan did not address the obvious First Amendment issue because he
thought that Nestor was procedurally barred from presenting a First Amendment
claim and, in any event, had not seriously argued the point. Id. at 613 n.7.
51. According to Black, the termination of benefits provision was an
uncompensated taking, a denial of procedural due process, a violation of the ex
post facto and bill of attainder clauses, and “part of a pattern of laws all of which
violate the First Amendment.” Id. at 628 (Black, J., dissenting). See also id. at 622
(Black, J., dissenting) (just compensation and due process); id. at 626–28 (Black,
J., dissenting) (ex post facto and bill of attainder).
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arbitrary nor irrational, even though the Acts violate specific Bill of Rights
safeguards.”52
Justice Black’s 1960 dissent in Flemming threw down the gauntlet
to the approach and language that Justice Harlan had used in addressing the
appellee’s due process argument. Harlan’s 1961 dissent in Poe took up that
challenge, and served notice that Harlan was doing so by describing his
framework of constitutional principles in the very language that Black had
rejected. Moreover, having signaled that his Poe opinion would engage
Black’s critique of his due process method, in the same sentence Harlan
upped the ante. Harlan did not intend simply to defend the legitimacy of
due process as one method among many. The form of due process
reasoning he was presenting was, in Harlan’s view, the core of all
legitimate constitutional adjudication. “Precisely because it is the
Constitution alone” that warrants any judicial review of laws enacted by a
legislature with plenary competence over ordinary issues of government,
“the basis of judgment as to the Constitutionality of state action must be a
rational one,” must be grounded in the sort of normative judgment that
Black thought beyond judicial authority.53
As suggested earlier, the primary attraction of Justice Black’s
understanding of constitutional law lay in the claim—easily stated as if it
were a self-evident truth—that because the Constitution is a written
document with an unchanging text, unless amended, constitutional
adjudication is, by definition, a matter of “stick[ing] to the simple
language” of the text.54 And because the Constitution is a text, judicial
review is legitimate only when it is limited to the enforcement of “policies
written into the Constitution” by language that restrains the courts “within
clearly marked constitutional boundaries.” Constitutional decision making,
in other words, may require interpretive decisions about what the
Constitution’s clearly marked “policies” are as a factual matter, but it
precludes the intrusion of any personal, normative evaluation of the
meaning, importance, or weight of the principles and values the
constitutional text embodies. Such questions are resolved by the text and
are beyond judicial consideration.55
52. The language quoted in this paragraph all comes from a single, dense
discussion in Black’s dissent, id. at 625–26. (Black, J., dissenting).
53. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) (emphasis added).
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
55. For the quoted language, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91–92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline
Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 601 n.4 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ.,
concurring)). See also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865,
879 (1960) (“Of course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for a
particular right, such as the fair trial requirements of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and the right of free speech protection of the First, involves a

2021]

HARLAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

81

Harlan’s response was that Black-style textualism has
constitutional law exactly backward. It is precisely because the
constitutional text is “the only commission” for the judiciary’s power of
judicial review that the Supreme Court is obligated not to approach that text
as Black would have it do, “in a literalistic way, as if we had a tax statute
before us.”56 The Constitution is indeed written law, but it is “the basic
charter of our society,”57 not a detailed statutory regime to be applied
through strict adherence to the literal meaning of its language. Harlan
disclaimed any suggestion that the constitutional text is empty or
unconstraining—it “set[s] out in spare but meaningful terms the principles
of government”58—but even that assertion of the text’s authority was a
direct contradiction of Black’s view. For Harlan, the central role of the
Constitution’s text is to set out general principles that demand the exercise
of judgment in their application, rather than to prescribe narrow rules the
specific meaning of which need only be construed. Given the kind of text it
is, the Constitution demands Harlan’s approach.
balancing of conflicting interests. Strict procedures may release guilty men;
protecting speech and press may involve dangers to a particular government. I
believe, however, that the Framers themselves did this balancing when they wrote
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. . . . Courts have neither the right nor the
power to review this original decision.”). Black’s textualism obliged him to allow
for judicial judgment whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952)
(Black, J., concurring) (“Some constitutional provisions are stated in absolute and
unqualified language. . . . Other constitutional provisions do require courts to
choose between competing policies, such as the Fourth Amendment which, by its
terms, necessitates a judicial decision as to what is an ‘unreasonable’ search or
seizure.’”). But even as to the Fourth Amendment, Black sometimes attempted,
rhetorically at least, to suggest that the court was determining a fact rather than
making a value judgment. See e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 865, 879 (1960) (“There may be much difference of opinion about whether a
particular search or seizure is unreasonable . . . if it is unreasonable, it is absolutely
prohibited”).
56. For Harlan, the language of the Internal Revenue Code could preclude
judicial reliance on policies that Congress might have intended but failed to state in
the text. See, e.g., United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957) (rejecting
the government’s reliance on “the policy of the statute” even though legislative
history and an administrative interpretation of the provision at issue expressed
apparent congressional purpose because “we cannot but regard this Treasury
Regulation as no more than an attempted addition to the statute of something which
is not there”). The Constitution, Harlan insisted, is a very different kind of
document.
57. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 316).
58. Id.
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Harlan supported the sweeping description of constitutional law
we have been examining with a single, unadorned citation, but his choice of
authority underscored his claim to be stating not an idiosyncratic
perspective, but the mainstream understanding of constitutional
adjudication in American law. Harlan, a careful legal craftsman with an eye
for detail, provided no pinpoint citation to the decision he cited, and I think
it clear that he intended the reader to give thoughtful consideration to his
implicit claim that McCulloch v. Maryland, read as a whole, supported all
that he had just written. In turn, we can understand Harlan's account of
constitutional decision making more clearly if we examine the seminal
opinion of Marshall on which Harlan was relying.
McCulloch was, of course, the Supreme Court’s great 1819
decision upholding the constitutionality of the Second National Bank and
its immunity from state taxation in a magisterial opinion written by Chief
Justice John Marshall. McCulloch, “perhaps the greatest of our
constitutional cases,” did not simply decide two issues of great practical
importance at the time.59 Of even broader, lasting significance was the
approach to constitutional adjudication that Marshall advocated and
McCulloch exemplified.60 Like Justice Harlan’s opinion in Poe, Marshall’s
59. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1969). The only justification for Professor Black’s
qualifying adverb, in my view and perhaps in his, is that “our constitutional cases”
include Brown v. Board of Education. But it is the decision in Brown, not Chief
Justice Warren’s deliberately muted opinion, that commands admiration.
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, and his description of constitutional decision
making, are of at least as momentous importance as the Court’s specific holdings.
The contemporary Supreme Court continues to treat the McCulloch opinion as
“foundational” to constitutional law. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960,
1968 (2019) (relying on Marshall’s reasoning). See also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492–93 (2019) (“As Chief Justice Marshall explained,
the Founders did not state every postulate on which they formed our Republic –
‘we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.’”)
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). Harlan
himself held Marshall and the McCulloch opinion in high regard. See, e.g., Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 69 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (relying on “[n]o
less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall, in M’Culloch v. Maryland”) (citation
omitted).
60. Marshall himself clearly thought it more important that McCulloch’s
mode of analysis be understood and accepted than that lawyers and other
Americans agreed with the Court’s actual holdings. Cf. John Marshall, Opinion, A
Friend to the Union II (April 28, 1819), THE PHILADELPHIA UNION, reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 103 (Gerald Gunther
ed. 1969) (“I do not fear contradiction from any fair minded and intelligent man
when I say that the principles laid down by the court for the construction of the
constitution may all be sound, and yet the act for incorporating the Bank be
unconstitutional.”).
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in McCulloch was, in part, his rebuttal to a view of constitutional law that
he thought wrong-headed, pernicious even. The argument for Maryland
presented in the case by Luther Martin, the state’s attorney general and one
of the few dissenting members of the Philadelphia framers’ convention, was
in Marshall’s immediate sights. But behind Martin, and the original source
of much of Martin’s argument, stood Thomas Jefferson and his 1791
cabinet opinion recommending that President Washington veto the bill
creating the First National Bank.61
Jefferson’s argument that the bank bill was unconstitutional rested
on an approach to constitutional reasoning that anticipated in remarkable
ways Justice Black’s much later position. Jefferson thought that a strict
adherence to the semantic meaning of the Constitution’s language was
essential because he believed anything else would allow the “interpreter” to
reach whatever conclusion he wished. In Jefferson’s view, “[t]o take a
single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn” by the
constitutional text “is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no
longer susceptible of any definition.”62 The necessary objective, if the
Constitution is to be binding law, was to remove the exercise of personal
judgment. To this end, Jefferson invoked narrow definitions of the
Constitution’s terms, legal canons of construction evolved to interpret
statutes, wills and contracts, and even a brief excursion into the at-the-time
still secret history of the framers’ convention, in his attempt to persuade
Washington that fidelity to the written Constitution was inconsistent with
approval of the bank.63
Marshall’s belated answer to Jefferson accused the latter of
fundamentally misunderstanding what type of written instrument the
Constitution is.
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of
all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would,
probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature,
61. Jefferson was secretary of state. For a discussion of the antagonistic
intellectual relationship between Jefferson’s and Marshall’s bank opinions, see H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
U.S. DRONE WAR 23–32 (2016). Marshall was thoroughly familiar with Jefferson’s
opinion since he had printed much of it in his biography of Washington. Id. at 27
n.15.
62. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for
Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in, JEFFERSON POWELL,
LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 42–43 (1991).
63. Id.
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therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves. . . . In considering this
question, then, we must never forget that it is
a constitution we are expounding.64
The Constitution is thus, by definition, an outline of the American
political system (in Harlan’s words, American society’s “basic charter”),
and so constitutional adjudication must proceed not by breaking down the
Constitution into isolated clauses and words, but by making sense of the
text as a whole, in light of the purposes and principles that the judge
perceives the Constitution to embody. That is what it means to recall that “it
is a constitution we are expounding.”65 Marshall’s description of the
reasoning processes the judge must employ in doing so is, I think,
unmistakably normative, not simply an investigation into facts or the
interpretation of the meaning of discrete words.66
Harlan reiterated this view of what Marshall meant the year after
Poe. In Glidden v. Zdanok, Harlan quoted Marshall in brushing aside what
64. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
65. Id.
66. Many passages in McCulloch seem to me to support this assertion. For a
partial sampling, see id. at 406 (the Tenth Amendment leaves “the question,
whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest, has been
delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the whole instrument.”) (emphasis added); id. at 407 (the
Constitution is to “receiv[e] a fair and just interpretation”) (emphasis added); id. at
408 (rejecting any conclusion that hampers the accomplishment of “the public
good” “unless the words imperiously require it”); id. at 409 (basing a conclusion on
“the dictates of reason”); id. at 421 (in evaluating the constitutionality of an act of
Congress based on the necessary and proper clause, among the necessary
considerations are whether it uses “means which are appropriate” and “consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution”) (emphasis added); id. at 426 (the
Bank’s immunity from state taxation rests on “no express provision [but] on a
principle which . . . entirely pervades the constitution”) (emphasis added); id. at
430–32 (rejecting the state’s arguments first on the basis of “just theory,” and then,
“waiving this theory for the present,” concluding that the state’s position is not
“consistent with a fair construction of the constitution” because the “principle” on
which it rests is “capable of changing totally the character of the instrument”)
(emphasis added). This aspect of McCulloch is even clearer in Marshall’s
newspaper essays defending his opinion, although in 1961 Harlan would not have
had access to the essays since they were edited and published in 1969. See, e.g.,
John Marshall, Opinion, A Friend of the Constitution III (July 2, 1819),
ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH
V. MARYLAND 168 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (stating that constitutional decisions
should conform to “that great paramount law of reason, which pervades and
regulates all human systems”).
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Harlan thought was the sort of over-nice parsing of constitutional language
Black’s textualism invited.67 In a much earlier case, the Court had stressed
the fact that Article III’s list of the possible categories of federal court
jurisdiction refers to “all Cases” falling within some categories of federal
jurisdiction but merely to “Controversies” (with no adjective) with respect
to others. Harlan dryly observed that “[t]o derive controlling significance
from this semantic circumstance seems hardly to be faithful to John
Marshall's admonition that ‘it is a constitution we are expounding,’” and
then went on to read the earlier decision as actually based on a
constitutional principle that was “well-settled and understood” from the
beginning but expressed nowhere in the text.68
The parallels between the Poe dissent and the McCulloch opinion
lie both in the positive account they give of the Constitution and in the
narrow textualism they reject. Harlan doubtless hoped that knowledgeable
readers would take note of both. In addition, equating his approach with
that of Marshall brought with it two other welcome implications. First, as
he went on to assert in his very next sentence, Harlan propounded his
“rational process in Constitutional adjudication” as a general truth about
constitutional law, and not simply a special defense of a controversial mode
of argument. In doing so, Harlan not only rebutted the charge of Black and
others that due process was a deviation from an earlier constitutional
orthodoxy,69 but implicitly claimed that his “rational process” of
adjudication applies to constitutional issues, such as the scope of
congressional power, where the constitutional text arguably provides more
guidance.70 Second, the citation to McCulloch reminds the knowledgeable
reader that Marshall had hinted that our understanding of the Constitution’s
requirements can properly develop over time.71 Harlan’s opinion would go
67. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 562 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality
opinion) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407)).
68. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407)). The precedent in
question was Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572–73 (1933).
69. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536 (1949) (Black, J.) (claiming that in “steadily reject[ing] the due process
philosophy enunciated in the [Lochner] line of cases,” the Court “has consciously
returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle”).
70. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188–99 n.27 (1968) (analyzing
and extending doctrinal principles and economic reasoning found in earlier cases,
and taking note of the role of the commerce clause’s text, in upholding extension of
Fair Labor Standards Act protections to state employees).
71. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (the Constitution is “intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs”); id. at 422–23 (pointing out that experience of a national bank’s
“importance and necessity” “in the administration of our finances” had persuaded
“statesmen of the first class” to abandon their “previous opinions” that the bank
was not a necessary and proper means of executing the fiscal powers and to concur
in “the importance of this instrument, as a means to effect the legitimate objects of
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on to defend the legitimacy of development and change in constitutional
law. Harlan’s initial citation to McCulloch foreshadowed that argument and
his claim that it is the recognition of development, not Black’s nominal
rejection of change in the Constitution’s application, that is the historical
norm.
C. The Meaning of “Due Process of Law”
Having succinctly but clearly set out his overall view of
constitutional adjudication, Justice Harlan turned to address the issues
raised by analyzing the validity of the Connecticut contraceptives law under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seen in the context of
his perspective, due process is not the anomaly that Justice Black and others
claimed, but its legitimacy and limits still must be established.
But as inescapable as is the rational process in
Constitutional adjudication in general, nowhere is it more
so than in giving meaning to the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, where the Federal
Government is involved, the Fifth Amendment, against the
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.72
Once again, Harlan chose to express himself in language that
implicitly, but no doubt deliberately, rejected Black’s style of textualism.
The due process clauses are, of course, authoritative texts, but if we are to
keep in mind Chief Justice Marshall’s injunction to remember that “it is
a constitution we are expounding,”73 the “rational process” of expounding
the clauses is not simply a matter of discovering and applying meaning that
is already there, fixed in the words of the clauses. Constitutional decision
making, as Harlan and (in Harlan’s view) Marshall understood it,
necessarily involves an element of creative judgment that can rightly be
described as “giving meaning to the prohibitions” that the due process
clauses impose.

the government”). These suggestions that some form of doctrinal development in
constitutional law is legitimate are even clearer in Marshall’s newspaper essays.
See, e.g., John Marshall, Opinion, A Friend of the Constitution III (July 2, 1819),
ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH
V. MARYLAND 170 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (the Constitution “is intended to be
a general system for all future times, to be adapted by those who administer it, to
all future occasions that may come within its own view”).
72. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73. The words “a constitution” are italicized in the earliest printed versions of
McCulloch of which I am aware.
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Once again, Harlan had suggested a great deal in a very few words.
A textualist like Black ordinarily starts with the assumption that
constitutional provisions have clear, discrete, semantic content or that the
history of their adoption will establish their meaning. As a consequence, the
Constitution is in principle unchanging in application. One answer is
correct and all others are wrong, then as now. Because textualism views
constitutional adjudication as the discovery of an objective fact about the
text rather than a rational process of determining the appropriate meaning to
give to the text, it is easy for the textualist to conclude that the substance he
finds congenial is the text’s obvious meaning.74
Harlan, on the other hand, thought it absurd to assume self-evident
clarity about a basic constitutional charter that sets out the principles of
government. The Constitution’s specific wording is certainly meaningful,
but how to explicate and apply that meaning is often subject to serious
debate, a fact that textualism effectively side steps. A judge cannot properly
address the interpretation of constitutional provisions, and especially ones
written broadly or ambiguously such as the due process clauses, based on
presumption or intuition-based fiat.75 Furthermore, textualists often assume
that the application of the relevant constitutional provision is
unproblematic, that once the meaning of the provision’s words is
determined, that meaning maps onto an actual constitutional controversy
without the intervention of personal normative judgment. Harlan thought
otherwise. Both in interpretation and application, the constitutional decision
maker must weigh conflicting views and determine which, in the judge’s
mind, is most persuasive.
74. In Harlan’s view, Black sometimes fell into this trap. For example, in
Wesberry v. Sanders the Court announced, in an opinion written by Black, that the
language of Article II requires that congressional districts be drawn on an equalpopulation basis. 376 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). Five years later, Harlan commented that
Black’s “constitutional reasoning I still find it impossible to swallow,” although he
accepted Wesberry as precedent that “I consider myself bound” to follow.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 542, 552 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
Wesberry itself, Harlan had filed an opinion that in his view—and that of many
other constitutional lawyers—had eviscerated Black’s textual and historical
arguments as completely implausible. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Compare id. at 7–8 (“[C]onstrued in its historical context, the
command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the
several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”), with id. at 41–42
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (summarizing his twenty-page discussion of text and history
with the conclusion that “the language of Art. I, §§ 2 and 4, the surrounding text,
and the relevant history are all in strong and consistent direct contradiction of the
Court's holding.”). This is discussed further in section II, below.
75. On the due process clauses’ ambiguity, see Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (It is “a
truism” to say that the clauses are “not self-explanatory” while the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment “sheds little light on the meaning of the provision”).
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It was characteristic of Harlan’s opinion writing to begin a
constitutional analysis by bringing up positions or doctrines that he did not
think controlling, and explaining why he was setting them to one side. In
his Poe opinion, he had already taken that approach in the first part of his
dissent, going through a number of considerations about justiciability and
showing the reader why, in his view, they did not support the Court’s
dismissal of the appeal. The technique’s intended effect presumably was to
increase the persuasiveness of Harlan’s approach by showing the reader that
alternative perspectives were untenable.76 So the first part of Harlan’s
specific discussion of due process in Poe dealt with two alternative
understandings of the clauses that Harlan believed that the Court had
repeatedly rejected and rightly so because they are flawed in principle.77
The first of these alternatives would read the due process clauses as
“limit[ed] to a guarantee of procedural fairness.”78 Although Harlan
respectfully commented that this position had been “ably and insistently
argued,” he argued that the argument rested on a misunderstanding of the
historical background and structural function of the language of “due
process of law.” The phrase originated in chapter 39 of Magna Carta, in
which the king promised not to “go against [any free man] or send against
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”79
The monarch’s promise to respect “the law of the land” or “due process of

76. This is discussed below. See also James Boyd White’s insightful analysis
of Harlan’s use of the same technique in Harlan’s great free speech opinion in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in White, Living Speech: Resisting the
Empire of Force 190–91 (2008).
77. In Poe, Harlan did not discuss a third view of the due process clause that
he later rejected, the process of “selective incorporation” of some but not all Bill of
Rights provisions, since that series of cases effectively began with Mapp v. Ohio,
decided the same day as Poe. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 497 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As
the pattern became clear, Harlan consistently rejected selective incorporation as
equally ahistorical and even more illogical than Black’s total incorporation
position. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (the selective incorporation precedents have “compromised on the ease
of the incorporationist position, without its internal logic. It has simply assumed
that the question before us is whether [the relevant Bill of Rights clause] should be
incorporated into the Fourteenth, jot-for-jot and case-for-case, or ignored. Then the
Court merely declares that the clause in question is ‘in’ rather than ‘out.’”).
78. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. This English translation is that of the Magna Carta Project. See The
Magna Carta Project, MAGNA CARTA RESEARCH, https://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.
uk/read/magna_carta_1215/Clause_39# [https://perma.cc/2RR7-265L] (last visited
July 11, 2021). The original Latin translated as “by the law of the land” is “per
legem terrae.” Id.
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law”80 was what we would call a procedural guarantee against lawless
executive action. Under English constitutional norms as they eventually
settled, such a guarantee could not be extended to limit Parliament’s
plenary legislative powers, nor was there any need for such a limitation.
Since Parliament is the sovereign source of law, by definition it cannot be a
lawless tyrant.
Constitutional arrangements in the United States are very different.
American legislatures are not sovereign and there is no conceptual
difficulty with the ideas of unlawful legislation or legislative tyranny.
Indeed, binding the legislature by laws adopted by the sovereign People is
part of the point of the written American constitutions.81 Therefore, Harlan
concluded, despite the procedural sound of the due process and law of the
land clauses found in state constitutional documents and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, if they are to accomplish the purpose of
prohibiting tyranny they must prohibit oppression through legislation as
well as unfair or inadequate procedure in executive actions.
Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would
fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life,
liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which
by operating in the future could, given even the fairest
possible procedure in application to individuals,
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three. Compare,
e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases; Butler v. Perry; Korematsu
v. United States. Thus the guaranties of due process, though
having their roots in Magna Carta's ‘per legem terrae’ and
considered as procedural safeguards ‘against executive
usurpation and tyranny,’ have in this country ‘become
bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation.’82
Harlan supported this explanation of why American constitutional
law had to extend beyond the original scope of Magna Carta to encompass
legislative tyranny with a citation to three earlier decisions. Since he did not
gloss the cases, the citation is cryptic on its face, but I think we can work
out why Harlan cited them. Doing so will further clarify our understanding

80. A fourteenth century act of Parliament adopted this wording in a
paraphrase of chapter 39. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 14–15 (1964).
81. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Certainly
all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.”).
82. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations abbreviated).
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of why Harlan rejected the fair-procedures-only reading of the due process
clauses, but that clarification requires a closer look at the cases.
Harlan’s citation invites the reader to “[c]ompare” the Supreme
Court’s decisions upholding the World War I military draft,83 the traditional
authority of local government to require an inhabitant “to labor for a
reasonable time on public roads near his residence without direct
compensation,”84 and the World War II exclusion of American citizens with
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast.85 In the two earlier decisions, the
Court reasoned that legal tradition, and, in the case of the military draft, the
delegation to Congress of the power to raise armies, demonstrated that
requiring individuals to perform what were understood as lawful
obligations owed to the public, was not a denial of an individual claimant’s
liberty.86 With the distinct and additional point that the challengers made no
claim that government had failed to follow appropriate procedures in
executing its power, the Court could conclude that due process had not been
violated. From Harlan’s perspective in Poe, the two cases illustrated a
Court carefully examining the substantive validity of governmental action
that restricted the freedom of the individual and concluding that the
restriction was not oppressive or tyrannical because it was pursuant to longsettled understandings of the individual’s duties under law.
Compare this to the Korematsu exclusion-order decision. A
contemporary lawyer would conceptualize Fred Korematsu’s claim in equal
protection terms. Korematsu was subjected to mandatory and, if necessary,
forcible exclusion from the area of his home and work solely because of his
racial or ethnic identity. But the Fifth Amendment has no equal protection
clause, and the Supreme Court’s decisions holding that the federal
government has the same equal protection duties as do the states—bound
83. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
84. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916).
85. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu is often
remembered as upholding the related detention in internment camps of those
subject to the West Coast exclusion order, but the majority expressly declined to
reach the validity of the detention order. See id. at 223 (“[W]e are dealing
specifically with nothing but an exclusion order”). Surprisingly, the Supreme
Court’s recent disavowal of Korematsu made precisely this mistake. See Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). The parallel between the actual decision in
Korematsu and the executive order upheld in Trump (which excluded certain
otherwise eligible foreign nationals from admission into the United States) is not
quite as remote as the Court’s faulty memory made it seem.
86. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 378 (rejecting the argument that
“compelled military service is . . . in conflict with all the great guarantees of the
Constitution as to individual liberty” because “the very conception of a just
government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the
citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right to compel it”);
Butler, 240 U.S. at 333 (“[T]o require work on the public roads has never been
regarded as a deprivation of either liberty or property”).
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by the Fourteenth Amendment’s express equal protection clause—were
decades away. Korematsu was obliged, therefore, to frame his central
constitutional challenge as the claim that he had been denied due process of
law. His brief argued that the exclusion order violated the due process
clause’s substantive protection of his liberty to live, work, and move as he
chose, its implicit prohibition on racial discrimination, and its guarantee of
procedural due process.87 As the Poe dissent would assert years later,
Korematsu’s brief claimed that the transplant of Magna Carta’s limit on
executive oppression into the American constitutional setting necessarily
expanded due process beyond a requirement of fair procedures. “The utter
inequality which has been practiced herein would seem to violate the due
process clause of the 5th Amendment for due process is synonymous with
‘law of the land’ which, in America, cannot mean one law for one citizen
and another for another citizen.”88
The government’s response was to deny that Fifth Amendment due
process puts any substantive limitation on the exercise of the federal war
powers.89 The Court, however, refused to accept that argument even as it
ruled in the government’s favor. Justice Black’s opinion for the majority90
87. Brief for Petitioner in Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (O.T. 1944), at
*47–49.
88. Id. at *48.
89. The Court’s earlier Hirabayashi decision upholding a curfew order limited
to persons of Japanese ancestry gave some credence to this bald assertion. See Brief
for Respondent in Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (O.T 1944) at *25 (“[I]f an
order was ‘an appropriate exercise of the war power its validity is not impaired
because it has restricted the citizen’s liberty’”) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)). Perhaps uneasy at relying too heavily on so broad
an assertion, at one point in its brief the government qualified its position slightly.
See id. at *24 (“Measures coming within the war power do not violate the Fifth
Amendment, whether or not they could be sustained in normal times, although that
Amendment must be considered in determining the validity of a particular exercise
of the war power under the circumstances which evoke it.”). But the government
also cited the Selective Draft Law Cases as supporting its Fifth Amendment
argument because that decision “denied the limiting effect of several other
constitutional provisions with respect to” Congress’s war powers authority to
impose “sacrifices on the part of individuals.” Id. at *25.
90. Black’s opinion is unmistakably at odds with his later textualism, which
denied any substantive dimension to the due process clauses other than the formal
role the Fourteenth Amendment clause played in the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. But in 1944, Black had not yet fully developed his textualist ideas. See
above n.32 discussing Black’s opinion for the Court in Marsh v. Alabama. Even
after the 1940s, however, Black was willing to give non-procedural, substantive
effect to the due process clauses when a question of racial equality was at stake. In
Bolling v. Sharpe and Loving v. Virginia, Black joined without stating any
reservation opinions of the Court that invoked the substantive dimension of due
process to invalidate, respectively, de jure racial segregation in the District of
Columbia and a state miscegenation law. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
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clearly acknowledged that the exclusion order was a direct, and indeed
severe, intrusion into substantive constitutional interests protected by the
due process clause. Black signaled as much at the beginning of his analysis.
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.91
The Fifth Amendment due process clause, in other words, puts a
severe substantive limit on the extent to which Congress and the executive
can restrict the exercise of “civil rights” along racial lines regardless of the
procedures used to enforce the restriction.
Later in his opinion, Black restated the Court’s agreement with
Korematsu that the exclusion order affected a constitutionally protected
liberty, at this point without mentioning the issue of racial discrimination.
“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except
under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions.”92 Nonetheless, the majority upheld the
exclusion order because it concluded it could not second guess the
(1967) (the right to marry is a “fundamental freedom” and limiting it by racial
classifications “is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (public school segregation imposes on black children “a
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause” of the Fifth Amendment). To be sure, the Loving Court
offered its due process rationale as an alternative to a more developed equal
protection holding, but Black declined to join Justice Stewart’s brief opinion
concurring in the judgment on equal protection grounds alone. See Loving, 388
U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring). Black’s decision not to join Stewart is all the
more striking because, as we shall see below, three years before Loving, Black and
Stewart filed dissents in Griswold v. Connecticut that rebut in tandem what they
both saw as incorrect revivals of Lochner era substantive due process. This may
only show that, as I myself think, Justice Black was a great, but not always
consistent, constitutional lawyer. See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (“Do I
contradict myself?/Very well then I contradict myself./(I am large, I contain
multitudes).”
91. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
92. Id. at 219–20. See also id. at 218 (“[E]xclusion from the area in which
one's home is located is a far greater deprivation than constant confinement to the
home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military
authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally
justify either.”).
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conclusion of Congress and the executive that the nation had faced
“circumstances of direst emergency and peril” at the relevant time.93
Korematsu’s challenge to the exclusion order was unsuccessful not because
he had failed to present weighty claims to due process protection but
because the Court thought them outweighed by a showing of military
necessity it could not reject and because under war time conditions it is
normatively appropriate for citizens to accept the imposition of hardships
and interferences with their freedom.94 In their dissents, Justices Murphy
and Jackson came to the opposite conclusion because they thought, for
similar but distinct reasons, that the government’s arguments failed to meet
the demands of due process.95
We can now return to the question of why Harlan thought
Korematsu, like the military draft (Selective Draft Law) and public-road
labor (Butler) decisions, supported his argument that due process cannot be
limited to guaranteeing fair procedure. In none of the three cases did the
individual(s) press a procedural due process argument. In fact, Fred
Korematsu conceded that he had no procedural due process claim in the

93. See id. at 218 (“‘[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress’”) (quoting and relying on Hirabayashi, 320
U.S. at 99).
94. See id. at 219 (“[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of
hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in
greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its
privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier.”).
95. Murphy explained that the correct “judicial test” would require the
government to show “a public danger that is so ‘immediate, imminent, and
impending’ as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary
constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.” Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
In his view, what the government had offered as justification for a blanket
exclusion order were unpersuasive arguments based ultimately on racism and
wholly inadequate as a basis for depriving citizens of “equal protection of the
laws . . . their constitutional rights to live and work where they will, to establish a
home where they choose and to move about freely.” Id. at 233–39 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Jackson grounded his dissent on the “fundamental assumption [that]
underlies our system . . . that guilt is personal and not inheritable.” Id. at 243
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Like Murphy, Jackson’s reasoning blended substantive
and procedural concerns. By upholding an order forcibly driving citizens from their
homes based on their ancestry, Jackson thought the majority had “validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
American citizens.” Id. at 243, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Roberts also dissented because he thought Korematsu had been subject
to conflicting orders requiring him to shelter in place and to leave the area. See id.
at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a citizen was constrained by two laws, or two
orders having the force of law, and obedience to one would violate the other, to
punish him for violation of either would deny him due process of law”). The
majority insisted that the orders in question were not in conflict. Id. at 220.
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district court.96 If due process guarantees only fair procedures, the outcome
in each case would have been unchanged—the government would have
prevailed—but for a different reason. The challenger(s) to the law in
question would have failed to present a constitutional claim. But in all three
cases the Court discussed at length the substantive validity of the law.
In the Selective Draft Law and Butler decisions, the conclusion of
the due process inquiry was that the interference with the individual’s
autonomy did not intrude on an aspect of liberty traditionally respected by
American law. Indeed, history validated the legitimacy of the restriction on
liberty in question, and thus the challengers had received due process of
law. In contrast, in Korematsu, all the justices agreed that the case involved
a severe governmental intrusion into aspects of individual liberty
traditionally respected in American law, and without historical
justification.97 The majority and the dissenters parted company over
whether the Court was obliged to accept the government’s claim that the
exclusion order did in fact rest on “pressing public necessity,” but no justice
denied that due process required the government to make such a showing
given the severity of the invasion of liberty.
Taken together, the three cases Harlan cited show the Court
reviewing the substantive validity of legislation, on issues unrelated to the
96. Id. at 220 (Korematsu “stipulated in his trial that he had violated [the
exclusion order], knowing of its existence.”). See also Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 376–77 (1918) (the cases were criminal prosecutions, and the
Supreme Court reviewed the defendants’ objections to the district courts’ rulings);
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (“Ample notice appears to have been
given and disregarded. There was an orderly trial and conviction before a duly
constituted tribunal”).
97. At this point, one may well object that in 1944 the American legal
tradition could hardly be said to have safeguarded freedom from racial
discrimination in reality. The point is sadly undeniable, but if we give a charitable
reading to Justice Black’s opinion, we might say that he was expressing what he
thought the tradition ought to have been doing all along. All racial discrimination
should be “immediately suspect” and “subject to the most rigid scrutiny.” Justice
Murphy is not usually remembered as a precise judge, but on this issue he rather
carefully spoke in aspirational rather than descriptive terms. “Racial discrimination
in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic
way of life. It is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free
people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United
States.” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Jackson pointed out
that American criminal law has never treated ancestral “guilt” as a basis for
criminal liability, and that in effect that is what discriminations based on race
amount to, at least in the criminal law context. Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is
personal and not inheritable. . . . But here is an attempt to make an otherwise
innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom
he had no choice, and belongs to a race from which there is no way to resign.”).
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discredited freedom of contract doctrine, and illustrated the way that history
could inform the Court’s judgment about the weightiness of an individual’s
claim to liberty. The decisions thus provided clear support for Harlan’s
claim that the Court had repeatedly rejected the procedure-only
understanding of due process, authority which he reinforced by
immediately following the citations with words quoted from a seventy-fiveyear-old decision, Hurtado v. California. The proposition that “in this
country,” the “guaranties of due process” have “‘become bulwarks against
arbitrary legislation’” thus predates the Lochner era.98
Read as provisions in our basic charter of government, the most
faithful construction of the spare but meaningful terms of the due process
clauses had long been known to require that the clauses be given a
substantive application. As Hurtado had explained long before, “[a]pplied
in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here
they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but in that
application . . . they must be held to guaranty, not particular forms of
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and
property.”99 By limiting American due process to its English scope, the
procedure-only interpretation of the clauses not only contradicts longstanding precedent—precedent older than Lochner and untainted by the
error, if such it be, of freedom of contract—but makes the American
guaranties unable to achieve, in the American constitutional setting, what
the English approach does under very different constitutional arrangements:
It leaves American citizens vulnerable to oppressive and arbitrary
interferences, unsanctioned by the sovereign, with their liberty.
The second flawed understanding of due process that Justice Harlan
dismissed as untenable was Justice Black’s theory of total incorporation,
which Harlan described as the view that “the Fourteenth Amendment,
whether by way of the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process
Clause, applied against the States only and precisely those restraints which
had prior to the Amendment been applicable merely to federal action.”100 In
later opinions, Harlan put great weight on the argument that Black was
historically mistaken, and that the incorporation theory did not carry out the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s leading proponents as Black
believed.101 In Poe, however, written just as the great incorporation
98. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
99. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532.
100. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540–41 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In discussing the
incorporation theory, Harlan mentioned neither the term nor Black.
101. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174–76 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Harlan also criticized incorporation for imposing on the states not just
the general principle of a particular Bill of Rights provision but its details as well.
See id. at 173 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing his critiques of incorporation). For
his history, Harlan relied chiefly on an article by Professor Charles Fairman that
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struggles of the 1960s were beginning,102 Harlan offered a different and
more fundamental objection.
The incorporation theory, Harlan correctly pointed out, required
one to disregard a long series of Supreme Court precedents. “Again and
again this Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment is
no more than a shorthand reference to what is explicitly set out elsewhere in
the Bill of Rights.”103 But for Harlan, the error with incorporation went
beyond its violation of the principle of stare decisis. The theory’s
proponents, he argued, had radically misunderstood how a judge should
approach the text of the Constitution. The underlying flaw in the
incorporation theory is, in other words, the same as that which renders the
procedure-only interpretation of due process untenable. Both approaches
mislead their proponents into ignoring Chief Justice Marshall’s injunction
to remember it is a Constitution we are expounding. In his Poe dissent,
Harlan interwove his demonstration of the incorporation theory’s version of
this mistake with his affirmative discussion of how a court should decide a
novel and difficult constitutional question in the tradition of McCulloch.
Harlan’s starting point for contrasting the incorporation theory with
Marshallian constitutional adjudication was to point out that the idea of
substantive protections for liberty that are not spelled out by specific
language in the constitutional text long predates the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[I]t is not the particular enumeration of rights in the first
eight Amendments which spells out the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment due process, but rather, as was suggested in
another context long before the adoption of that
Amendment, those concepts which are considered to
embrace those rights “which are . . . fundamental; which
belong . . . to the citizens of all free governments,” Corfield
Fairman wrote in response to Black’s seminal incorporation opinion in Adamson.
See id. at 174, n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The overwhelming historical evidence
marshalled by Professor Fairman demonstrates, to me conclusively, that the
Congressmen and state legislators who wrote, debated, and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment did not think they were ‘incorporating’ the Bill of Rights”). More
recent research suggests that Fairman (and Harlan) greatly overstated the case
against Black’s belief that leading proponents thought the amendment would
incorporate the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
102. Looking back from the end of the decade, Harlan described it as “a decade
that has witnessed revolutionary changes in the most fundamental premises of
hitherto accepted constitutional law.” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 266
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is clear from the context that Harlan chiefly had in
mind the almost-complete selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
103. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

2021]

HARLAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

97

v. Coryell, for “the purposes [of securing] which men enter
into society,” Calder v. Bull.104
Once again, to understand fully what Harlan’s opinion means, we
should take seriously the cases he cites as authorities. The Corfield
language was from an opinion written by Justice Bushrod Washington
“riding circuit” in a case decided four years after McCulloch. One issue in
Corfield involved the scope of the clause in Article IV of the Constitution
providing that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”105 Washington rejected
the argument that a New Jersey law limiting oyster and clam harvesting to
residents of the state violated the Article IV clause. In doing so, he opined
that the term “privileges and immunities” is “confin[ed]” to “those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental,” and that
the privilege of engaging in oyster fishing was not among them.106 In its
immediate context, Washington’s point was to contrast the general legal
rights that he thought the Article IV clause protects with access to a state’s
natural resources, which in his view were “the common property of the
citizens of such state.”107 But Washington’s discussion of the privileges and
immunities that Article IV does protect was to prove widely and extremely
influential, and it is that discussion that Harlan invoked in Poe.108
Justice Washington offered two approaches to describing the scope
of the privileges and immunities clause. Washington first described the
method a court should use in determining if a privilege or immunity is
104. Id.
105. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 1.
106. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
107. Washington’s distinction paralleled one Marshall had drawn in
McCulloch between a state tax on the operations of the national bank, which the
Court held invalid, from “a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common
with the other real property within the state,” which Marshall expressly noted
would be constitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436
(1819). National unity, which both the McCulloch tax immunity doctrine and
Article IV safeguard, is consistent with recognizing some degree of state authority
to control the use of resources found within the state by non-residents. Given the
centrality of private property rights to early American constitutional thought, it is
unsurprising that Washington made it clear that as a general matter the right “to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal” is a fundamental
privilege protected by Article IV. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
108. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 384
(1978) (“[T]he Court has described [Corfield] as ‘the first, and long the leading,
explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause. . . .’”) (citation omitted); Lee
Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 67
VAN. L. REV. 609, 632–33 (2014) (“For almost two hundred years, the leading case
interpreting the meaning of ‘privileges and immunities’ has been Corfield v.
Coryell. . . .”).
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“fundamental” and thus within the clause. Second, he “enumerate[d]” the
rights the clause protects. As to the first approach, Washington went
beyond simply attaching the label “fundamental” to rights he personally
thought important. Privileges and immunities are fundamental if they
“belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments” and if they “have,
at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign.”109 Deciding whether a particular privilege is within Article IV’s
protection thus requires the court to make a normative judgment about the
importance of the privilege to a governmental system like ours and an
historical judgment about the privilege’s status in the American legal
tradition.110 Both elements are present in Justice Harlan’s due process
analysis.
Washington’s second approach was, on the surface, very different.
Rather than suggesting a method of inquiry, he proffered a list of answers.
In fact, despite asserting that “it would perhaps be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate” the privileges and immunities that are fundamental,
Washington insisted on providing the reader with two lists. One was a
catalog of specific “right[s]” that Washington thought covered by Article
IV,111 while the other asserted that “fundamental principles” under Article
IV “may . . . be all comprehended under the following general heads.”112 A
careless reader who glanced too quickly at what one commentator has
called “the famous Corfield list of privileges and immunities”113 might well

109. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
110. Washington also observed that fundamental privileges and immunities
are those “the enjoyment of [which] by the citizens of each state, in every other
state, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the
corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) ‘the better to secure
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different
states of the Union.’” Id. at 552.
111. See id. (“The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as
some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the
laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.”).
112. Id. at 551.
113. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and
Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 153, 305 n.503 (2009). Professor Wildenthal’s important article is not
directly concerned with Corfield, and I do not mean to fault him for eliding what I
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think that Justice Harlan was making a serious mistake in citing Corfield in
Poe. Washington’s claim that very broad constitutional language should be
construed to mean a specific list of rules seems to be precisely the logic of
total incorporation.
Harlan, however, made no mistake, and a close reading of Corfield
shows that it supports Harlan’s argument against incorporation.
Washington’s set of specific rights was expressly non-exclusive114 and he
explained that the rights he did mention were on the list because they “are
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental.”115 In other words, they are an incomplete specification of the
“fundamental principles” outlined in Washington’s other list. Washington
described that list of principles in terms broad enough to serve as a
comprehensive description of the constitutional relationship between
government and individual liberty. Article IV concerns “fundamental
principles [that] may be all comprehended under the following general
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”116
Washington’s enumeration approach to explaining the privileges
and immunities clause converges with his other methodological discussion.
Both assume that American constitutional law can and must work at times
with principles that cannot simply be deduced from the Constitution’s
words, that courts have the capacity and the obligation to discern the
specific legal entitlements that must be recognized to give those principles
their proper effect, and that in doing so judges must make normative as well
as historical judgments rather than simply consult a determinate
enumeration of those rights.117 Harlan’s understanding of constitutional
adjudication embraces each of these assumptions, while Black’s textualism
and his incorporation theory both rest on his fundamental disagreement
with all three.
Harlan’s second quotation in the sentence we are considering is
from a decision even older than Corfield. Calder v. Bull, decided in 1798,
was one of the Supreme Court’s first constitutional law cases and addressed
believe a closer reading shows to be two distinct lists making somewhat different
points.
114. The list of specific rights ends with the comment that “[t]hese, and many
others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and
immunities. . . .” Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 152.
115. Id. at 552.
116. Id. at 551–52.
117. The language of the privileges and immunities clause virtually demands
that courts make such judgments. It is faintly ironic that Washington’s Corfield
opinion itself has sometimes been treated, in later cases, as a determinate list. Id. at
552.
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the meaning of the ex post facto clause of Article I § 10. There was no
opinion of the Court, and the phrase Harlan quoted is from Justice Samuel
Chase’s seriatim opinion, which the “Court has recognized as providing an
authoritative account of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”118 Harlan’s
interest, however, lay not in Chase’s discussion of that clause but in a
discussion earlier in the opinion of a question that Chase himself admitted
was not before the Court. Are there limitations on what a state legislature or
Congress can do that are not derived from the text of any constitutional
provision? Chase’s answer was an emphatic yes.
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State
Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control;
although its authority should not be expressly restrained by
the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. . . . The
purposes for which men enter into society will determine
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are
the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide
what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This
fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our
free Republican governments. . . . An ACT of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered
a rightful exercise of legislative authority. . . . To maintain
that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such
powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in
my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in
our free republican governments.119
Chase also provided examples of legislative acts that would be
contrary to the purposes of free republican governments and thus, in his
view, of no legal effect, but he made it clear that the list was not
exclusive.120 Determining if a legislative act violates “the great first
principles of the social compact” seems, in his view, to be primarily a
normative judgment, although Chase, who was a signatory to the

118. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003).
119. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (opinion of Chase,
J.). The first sentence in this passage is not entirely clear: I believe that Justice
Chase meant that he could not concede that there are no legal constraints on a state
legislature except those imposed “expressly” by a constitutional text. Id. at 387.
Chase subsequently made it clear that he thought that Congress is similarly
constrained.
120. Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (prefacing his list with “[a] few instances
will suffice to explain what I mean.”).
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Declaration of Independence, doubtless thought the history of American
revolutionary and constitutional thought relevant to that judgment.121
The specific questions before Justice Chase in 1798 and Justice
Washington in 1823 were different, and they use somewhat different
terminologies, but their opinions both rest on the assumption that
constitutional law is not limited to parsing the specific language of the
Constitution, and each displays a robust confidence in the legitimacy of
courts making normative judgments about the existence and application of
constitutional principles that cannot be ascribed in any strong sense to
constitutional texts. From this shared perspective, the incorporation theory’s
attempt to constrain due process analysis within the textual confines of the
Bill of Rights is simply bad constitutional law, an “altogether inadmissible”
“political heresy.”122 For Harlan, quoting Chase had the additional
advantage of reminding the knowledgeable reader that Justice William
Iredell’s opinion in Calder had criticized Chase along lines very similar to
those Justice Black would employ a century and a half later. Black’s
approach to constitutional law, in other words, was proposed, and
challenged, a very long time ago.123
Harlan intended to do more than show that the incorporation theory
and, by implication, Black’s textualism in general are untenable. The
quotations from Corfield and Calder affirmatively demonstrate that crucial
aspects of his understanding of due process go back to the Supreme Court’s
121. See id. (“The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or
forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure
the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence.”).
122. Id. at 389.
123. Id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“If, on the other hand, the Legislature
of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law,
within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce
it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of
natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court
could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of
an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.”). Some scholars
have wondered if Iredell was in fact responding to Chase, noting in particular that
Iredell spoke only of objections to legislation based on “natural justice,” an
expression that Chase did not use. This seems highly unlikely to me: Iredell’s
remarks have no apparent role except to rebut Chase. In any event, the Chase and
Iredell opinions have long been read as a debate over Chase’s claim that the
purposes of an American free government put legal limits on legislative power
even in the absence of an express textual prohibition. See, e.g., Livingston's Lessee
v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 491 (1833) (argument of counsel)
(“Judge CHASE affirms these positions; Judge IREDELL denies them,
in Calder v. Bull. . . .”) (citation omitted). Harlan would have quoted Chase with
this long-standing understanding in mind.
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earliest period and were held by Marshall Court justices. But establishing
an historical pedigree for his views did not, in itself, answer Black’s and
Iredell’s claim that all fundamental principles approaches amount, in the
end, to the assertion by judges of the power to set aside legislation merely
because in the private opinion of the judges the statute conflicts with
abstract principles. Harlan’s refutations of the procedure only and
incorporation views of due process therefore play only a preliminary, albeit
critical, role in setting the stage for Harlan to present what he claimed is the
authentic and traditional understanding of due process. Harlan’s
presentation was shaped in part by the need to show that his understanding
is not rightly open to criticisms like Black’s.
Let us recall Harlan’s most basic assumption. As McCulloch v.
Maryland taught, the Constitution is the basic charter of our society and
establishes our general principles of government. It does not follow that the
Constitution’s provisions are all pitched at a high level of generality.
Harlan thought, for example, that the Article III and Sixth Amendment
guarantee to federal criminal defendants of trial by “jury” incorporated the
historical common law definition of that term, including aspects of the
definition that are unnecessary to the general principle served by the
guarantee.124 But it would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s “nature”
to treat the broadly-worded due process clauses as if they were discrete
rules with an historically fixed meaning. The clauses state, on their face, a
general principle, and fidelity to constitutional text requires that judges treat
them as such by making inescapably normative judgments about how the
general principle applies in specific cases.125 The further and inevitable
consequence is that the judicial applications of due process will develop
over time, not because the courts are illegitimately amending the text but
because the text itself demands a “rational process in Constitutional
adjudication” that fills out the meaning-as-applied of the clauses’ general
principle through a common-law style elaboration of doctrine.126 What then
is that principle?
As he suggested by the language he borrowed from Corfield v.
Coryell—“rights . . . ‘which belong . . . to the citizens of all free

124. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 n.21 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (The Sixth Amendment imposes “the common-law . . . requirements”
that the jury consist of exactly twelve persons and reach its verdict unanimously.).
125. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (The
Constitution’s “nature . . . requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was
entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.”).
126. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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governments’”—for Harlan due process concerns the basic relationship
between the individual and American government.127
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society. [And] the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been
a rational one.128
Both individual freedom and government’s authority to seek the
common good are constitutionally weighty values, and the Constitution
neither requires nor permits that either be simply dismissed out of hand.
Because both are so important, when liberty and government come into
conflict, it is impossible even in theory to resolve the conflict by using a
methodological algorithm or by consulting a predetermined list of answers.
The judicial task in such a controversy is to find the point of balance that
respects the just claims of both liberty and authority in the light of the
ongoing tradition of American legal thought that has its roots in, among
other sources, Magna Carta’s rejection of governmental oppression.
The details of how Justice Harlan thought a court should ascertain
that balance will unfold as we work through the rest of his Poe opinion. It
may assist the reader to know up front that by the term “balance,” Harlan
did not in fact mean the sort of interest balancing that Justice Frankfurter
had championed and Justice Black had attacked for years, and that after
Harlan and Black left became characteristic of the Burger Court.129
For Harlan in Poe, the normative judgments due process requires
courts to make are genuinely legal judgments, not quasi-legislative choices
among competing values, and judges make them by considering criteria
found in the law, not in their personal opinions. “Each new claim to
Constitutional protection must be considered against a background of
Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and
127. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.,
546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
128. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. In a classic article, Professor Aleinikoff explained that “although
[Harlan’s Poe dissent] purports to be a balancing opinion, [it] is in fact nothing of
the kind.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 998 n.308 (1987). It might be more exact to say that Harlan used
the “balance” metaphor in a different sense than did the Burger Court, but
Aleinikoff and I agree substantively that Harlan in Poe was not engaged in
“balancing” as the term is ordinarily used.
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historically developed.”130 The judge’s task in a novel or difficult due
process case is not to assign metaphorical “weights” based on the values he
or she would assign personally to the individual and governmental interests
in conflict. Instead, the judge must use the law’s tools of reasoning to
evaluate the scope of those interests, the extent to which the interests
overlap in the particular case, and the propriety of subordinating one
interest to the other in the particular case. The judge must make these
evaluations in light of history and precedent, guided by the holdings and
analyses in earlier cases.
Harlan was aware, of course, that his insistence on the role of
personal judgment in due process analysis—“there is no ‘mechanical yardstick,’ no ‘mechanical answer’”131—opened him to Black’s long-standing
charge that such an approach to due process is a usurpation of the
legislative function.132 Immediately after describing due process as entailing
a search for the correct balance between “liberty and the demands of
organized society,” Harlan flatly denied that due process decision making,
as he understood it, freed judges “to roam where unguided speculation
might take them.”133
Harlan concluded his general discussion of due process with a
lengthy quotation from Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in
Rochin v. California which asserted that “‘the limits that bind judges in
130. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. The quotations are from a Frankfurter opinion that discussed at some
length Frankfurter’s approach to due process. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Since due process is not
a mechanical yardstick, it does not afford mechanical answers. In applying the Due
Process Clause judicial judgment is involved in an empiric process in the sense that
results are not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable.”). This article does not
explore the complex relationship between the constitutional thought of Frankfurter
and that of Harlan. I agree with the widely-accepted view that his older colleague
strongly influenced Harlan in his first years on the Court; on the fundamental
question of whether constitutional law should resemble common law in its
intellectual method or instead follow Black-style textualist lines, the two were in
unchanging agreement. In addition, both accepted the inevitability of a role for
personal judgment in constitutional adjudication, although as discussed below,
think they disagreed quite sharply on what that means. We need not resolve the
exact degree to which the Poe dissent is compatible with Frankfurter’s views
beyond these points.
132. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J., concurring in the result)
(“[A]pplication of this natural law concept, whether under the terms
‘reasonableness', ‘justice’, or ‘fair play’, makes judges the supreme arbiters of the
country's laws and practices. . . . This result, I believe, alters the form of
government our Constitution provides.”) (internal citation omitted).
133. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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their judicial function’” as a general matter also limit a court’s exercise of
normative judgment in making due process decisions.134 But what preceded
Harlan’s invocation of Rochin subtly recast Frankfurter’s original point.
Frankfurter’s argument was essentially defensive, and insisted that Black’s
critique was unjustified because “‘considerations that are fused in the whole
nature of our judicial process’”135 constrain the extent to which a judge can
exercise a legislative-like discretion in judgment. But Harlan’s Poe dissent
flipped the response to Black from defense to offense. What Harlan offered
the reader was an affirmative description of how a judge, working within
the McCulloch tradition of constitutional adjudication, ought to go about
deciding due process issues. Harlan’s point was that a decision reached
through the means he described does not require or permit the judge to act
like a legislator or engage in “unguided speculation” because his or her
reasoning is at every point entirely and legitimately judicial.136 Black’s
critique was erroneous because Black’s own understanding of constitutional
adjudication, which disavowed the unavoidable and legitimate use of
normative judgment, was fundamentally flawed.
How then should a judge, confronted with a novel or difficult due
process claim, approach the task of deciding it? First, a court evaluating a
due process claim is, in real sense, speaking for “our Nation” and its
judgment must therefore be based on existing American political and legal
traditions, which provide the starting point and legitimating basis for its
analysis.
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A
decision of this Court which radically departs from it could
not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has
survived is likely to be sound. The decision of an
apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which
follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The

134. Id. at 542, 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 170–71 (1952) (“The matter was well put in Rochin v. People of State of
California[:] ‘The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at
large. We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard
the limits that bind judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due
process of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations
that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process. These are considerations
deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.’”))
(internal citation omitted).
135. Id. at 544–45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170).
136. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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new decision must take “its place in relation to what went
before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.”137
Adherence to tradition anchors due process decisions in two
sources of constitutional law reasoning that Harlan thought unquestionably
legitimate. First, the English constitutional and common-law background to
the written Constitution and early American constitutional discussions, and
second, “the course of this Court’s decisions.”138 In this regard, Harlan’s
invocation of “tradition” might have seemed innocuous to someone like
Black, although Black would have insisted that past precedent, if
sufficiently erroneous, must give way to present judgment about the
Constitution’s textual meaning. Lochner, after all, was one of many cases in
“the course of this Court’s decisions” on freedom of contract.139
For Harlan, however, to understand due process as a tradition of
thought is not merely to recognize the relevance of specific past authorities
to today’s decision. The English and founding-era background are not a set
of rules encoded in the words of the due process clauses as Black
sometimes suggested. Instead, they provide the foundation of principle and
purpose on the basis of which the Court legitimately makes decisions that
go beyond what earlier constitutional lawyers had recognized.140 Due
137. Id. at 542, 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvine, 347 U.S. at 147
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). In a case decided four years before Poe, Harlan
explained that the Court’s understanding of the scope of Congress’s powers may
properly develop over time. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 67–69 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring in the result) (rejecting the argument that an Article I power is
“incapable of expansion under changing circumstances” and relying on the
necessary and proper clause and McCulloch v. Maryland).
138. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. Cf. Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
627–28 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that the contracts clause of Article I
section 10 invalidated a state statute rewriting the terms of the college’s royal
charter). Marshall rejected as inconsistent with the nature of the constitutional text
the argument that the specific purpose of the clause was to prohibit legislative
interference with contemporary, executory contracts and that the clause was
therefore inapplicable to the modification of a government grant long since
executed.
It is more than possible, that the preservation of rights of this
description was not particularly in the view of the framers of the
constitution, when the clause under consideration was introduced
into that instrument. It is probable, that interferences of more
frequent occurrence, to which the temptation was stronger, and of
which the mischief was more extensive, constituted the great
motive for imposing this restriction on the state legislatures. But
although a particular and a rare case may not, in itself, be of
sufficient magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by
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process thought is therefore a “living” tradition, one in which the Court’s
obligation is to identify and continue the trajectory of thought and decision
rather than to return continually to the explicit understandings of any past
point in time. Acting within a living tradition in Harlan’s sense did not
involve, as Black feared, the exercise of a “broad, unbounded judicial
authority” or transform the Court into “a day-to-day constitutional
convention.”141 The reliance on established legal principles and appropriate
adherence to stare decisis that Harlan required validate a well-reasoned due
process decision even if it upholds a claim of liberty never recognized in
the past, and also serve as a basis for determining when a precedent ought
not be followed. Due process decision making is a living and legitimate
tradition because correct due process reasoning accommodates change and
development while ensuring fidelity to past constitutional principles.142
As we saw above, earlier in his opinion Justice Harlan insisted that
all constitutional law, and not simply the law of the due process clauses,
depends for its legitimacy on “the rational process in Constitutional
adjudication,” the exercise of normative judgment about how constitutional
principles apply to a particular issue, and not simply on an exegesis of the
relevant constitutional text. Harlan returned to that assertion in presenting
the second aspect of sound due process thinking. “[T]he supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational
process. . . . Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be
considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have
been rationally perceived and historically developed.”143 Previous
understandings and existing precedent are the starting point for inquiry into
the rule, when established, unless some plain and strong reason
for excluding it can be given. It is not enough to say, that this
particular case was not in the mind of the convention, when the
article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was
adopted. It is necessary to go further, and to say that, had this
particular case been suggested, the language would have been so
varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special
exception. The case being within the words of the rule, must be
within its operation likewise.
Id. at 644–45.
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675–76
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I have heretofore had many occasions to express
my strong belief that there is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to
use the Due Process Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the
meaning of the Constitution as written so as to add to it substantive constitutional
changes which a majority of the Court at any given time believes are needed to
meet present-day problems.”).
142. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 542, 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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the scope of liberty under the due process clauses, but they do not provide a
determinate set of answers to the question, nor (pace Justice Black) do the
provisions of the Bill of Rights.
[T]he imperative character of Constitutional provisions . . .
must be discerned from a particular provision's larger
context. And, inasmuch as this context is one not of words,
but of history and purposes, the full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in
or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.144
The larger context of the due process clauses that their “history and
purposes” provide is the constitutional imperative of prohibiting oppressive
or tyrannical governmental action regardless of its nature, form, or
source.145 Restricting “liberty” to the particular freedoms mentioned in the
Bill of Rights, as Black would have the Court do, would leave even the
most oppressive interference with liberty unchecked if it took a form
different from those anticipated and addressed by the makers of the Bill of
Rights, and in so doing, make the United States Constitution’s prohibition
on tyranny narrower than the Magna Carta’s.146
To achieve their historically identified purpose, therefore, the due
process clauses must be “suppl[ied]” a content that addresses all potential
forms of oppression. Rather than borrowing language from an earlier case,
which might have implied that there is some canonical formula, Harlan
summarized due process liberty as protecting “a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary

144. Id. at 542–43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
145. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
146. As noted earlier, because Parliament is sovereign, as a conceptual matter
unlawful legislative action is usually thought a conceptual impossibility in English
constitutional theory. By banning unlawful executive action, the Magna Carta thus
prohibited the only form of illegal political oppression possible in the English
system.
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impositions and purposeless restraints.”147 In support, he offered a string
citation to earlier due process cases led by Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the first
case in which the Supreme Court upheld a freedom of contract claim.148
Invoking Allgeyer, the original fountainhead of Lochner era doctrine, was a
bold and even startling act in the post-New Deal era, but Harlan’s point in
doing so seems clear. Harlan held no brief for freedom of contract as a
special constitutional value, and the next three cases in the string citation
were ones in which the Court rejected a contractual freedom claim while
defending the legitimacy of judicial protection for liberty.149 The
implication of the citations was that what was right about Allgeyer was not
its decision to give special protection to freedom of contract, but its
methodological assumption that the Court can legitimately make normative
judgments about which aspects of liberty do deserve such protection.
Harlan made that implication explicit by adding, immediately after the
string citation, the assertion that due process analysis requires judges to
147. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591–92 (1897).
149. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898), and Booth v. Illinois, 184
U.S. 425, 428 (1902), cited Allgeyer as recent authority for the conclusion that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits “unjust and oppressive legislation,” although they
rejected the particular due process claims before the Court. See Holden, 169 U.S. at
392 (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591). See also Booth, 184 U.S. at 428 (“Many
propositions that meet our entire approval.”) (quoting Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589).
The opinion of the Court in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), was
particularly apt from Harlan’s perspective. Nebbia cited Allgeyer once in a
footnote, glossing the statement that “neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute.” See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 523, n.9 (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591).
Furthermore, Nebbia ignored Lochner altogether, while reiterating the general due
process principle that oppressive legislation may be unconstitutional. See id. at 539
(stating that legislation “is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.”).
Harlan rounded off the string of authorities by citing Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957), (overturning a state supreme court’s
refusal to permit a former Communist Party member to take the bar examination),
and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring)
(concluding that a state law requiring the sterilization of persons convicted of
repeatedly committing crimes of moral turpitude violated due process). Stone’s
underlying concern was with the absence of adequate procedures, but he treated the
constitutional problem as a substantive flaw in the statute. See Skinner, 316 U.S.
535, 544–45 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring). Including Schware in the list was a
bit puckish, since Black wrote the opinion of the Court, although to be fair to the
latter, his reasoning was basically procedural, with strong First Amendment
overtones. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 247. Harlan joined Frankfurter’s separate
opinion which described the due process principle involved as prohibiting reliance
on “a wholly arbitrary standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of
reason.” Id. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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recognize “what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment.”150
Citing Allgeyer, rather than the better-known Lochner, suggested a
second point. The opinion of the Court in Lochner made no effort to explain
why contractual freedom is constitutionally weighty, contenting itself with
the statement that Allgeyer had said that it was,151 but in Allgeyer the Court
had been less cavalier and had reasoned that the importance of freedom of
contract was implied in the basic liberty to live a free and productive life.152
Allgeyer, in other words, was a proper example of the “rational process in
Constitutional adjudication,” although in Harlan’s view the Court might
have made a misstep in including contractual freedom as a fundamental
aspect of liberty.153 The fact that the Court had subsequently abandoned
Allgeyer’s specific freedom of contract holding supported Harlan’s overall
account of due process since the “living tradition” of due process had
ultimately corrected the Court’s error.
Harlan brought out the implications of rehabilitating Allgeyer as a
principle of analysis by reviewing two 1920s decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which had invalidated respectively a
prohibition on the teaching of foreign languages and a requirement of
public school attendance as violations of Fourteenth Amendment due
process.154 Harlan admitted that “today those decisions would probably
have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and
conscience assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment,
concepts that are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First
Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and
belief.”155 However, as Harlan pointed out, Meyer and Pierce reached their
results not by construing the text of the First Amendment’s “explicit
guarantees” but by making the sort of normative judgments that Allgeyer,
and Harlan, thought due process demands and therefore legitimates.156
150. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
151. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
152. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (“The liberty mentioned in that amendment
means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out
to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.”).
153. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
155. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
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As was said in Meyer, “this court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed. Without
doubt, it denotes, not merely freedom from bodily
restraint.” Thus, for instance, when in that case and in
Pierce, the Court struck down laws which sought not to
require what children must learn in schools, but to
prescribe, in the first case, what they must not learn, and in
the second, where they must acquire their learning, I do not
think it was wrong to put those decisions on “the right of
the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up
children,” Meyer, or on the basis that “The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.” Pierce.157
The rights to “establish a home and bring up children” and the
freedom from “any general power . . . to standardize its children” are not of
course expressly stated in the Constitution’s text.158 To approve them as
“the basis” for the Court’s specific holdings in Meyer and Pierce is to
recognize the capacity of judicial reasoning to identify the legitimacy and
scope of the principles necessary to make normative judgments about what
the “liberty” protected by the text requires.
Nothing in this due process analysis changes, Harlan added, if one
rests Meyer and Pierce on the freedoms of “conscience and expression,”
even if one speaks of these aspects of liberty as First Amendment freedoms
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan expected the reader to
recall that the Court had consistently rejected Black’s theory of total
incorporation, and that as a consequence the rationale for treating a Bill of
Rights freedom as protected by Fourteenth Amendment due process cannot
be,as Black maintained, simply that the freedom finds textual expression in
the Bill of Rights. “For it is the purposes of those guarantees and not their
text, the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the statement
itself, which have led to their present status in the compendious notion of
‘liberty’ embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.”159 Due process
reasoning, the normative search for the correct balance between liberty and
authority based on the Constitution’s purposes “as they have been rationally
perceived and historically developed,” is an inescapable and entirely
legitimate tool of constitutional law.160
157. Id. at 543–44 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations adjusted) (quoting Pierce,
268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
158. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399;
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
159. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
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D. Due Process Analysis Misapplied: The Parties’ Arguments
Having set out “the framework of Constitutional principles in
which I think the issue must be judged” in section I of his discussion of
“Constitutionality,” Justice Harlan turned to the merits of the particular
constitutional issue Poe v. Ullman presented.161 Harlan divided his
discussion of the merits into two sections, and in doing so created what
seems on its face an interpretive difficulty. Section II asserts, but makes no
effort to show, that the liberty in question is one of those “interests [that]
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment.”162 Particularly in light of Justice Black’s accusations that
views such as Harlan’s rest on nothing but the judge’s “own concepts of
decency and fundamental justice,”163 section II’s bald declaration that the
Connecticut statute “unquestionably” deprives [the appellants] of a
substantial measure of liberty” is striking, and unlikely to be accidental.164
What point was Harlan making?
The answer, I believe, lies in the role that section II plays in the Poe
dissent as a whole. The reader will recall that in discussing due process
analysis generally, Harlan first tried to persuade the reader that the
procedure only and total incorporation views of Fourteenth Amendment
due process are untenable, and having set out that negative backdrop, he
presented his own approach as persuasive in part because it is free of the
problems with the other positions. In parallel fashion, section II attempted
to demonstrate that the primary arguments of both the appellants and the
state gave untenable descriptions of the constitutional interests lying on
either side of the controversy in Poe.165 In doing so, section II’s purpose
161. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In fact, section II does not actually
identify what claim of liberty that Harlan thought persuasive. The reader already
knows the answer to that question, however, because Harlan gave it in his
discussion of whether the case was justiciable. See id. at 536 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he most substantial claim which these married persons press is their right to
enjoy the privacy of their marital relations free of the enquiry of the criminal law”).
See the discussion in section I.F.
163. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
164. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
165. See Brief for Appellants in Poe v. Ullman, Nos. 60, 61 (O.T. 1960), at *8
(summarizing two lead arguments as “[t]he Connecticut laws prohibit the most
effective methods of contraception but permit prescription and use of the most
unreliable methods. . . . The Connecticut laws are not reasonably related to the
presumed end.”). Their brief discussed “a constitutionally protected interest in the
privacy of their homes,” id. at *28–29, as one of the factors weighing in their favor
in their fourth argument, that “[t]he hardship upon individuals and the injurious
social consequences of these laws far outweigh any assumed advantages.” Id. at *9.
See Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. in Poe v. Ullman,
Nos. 60, 61 (O.T. 1960), at *9 (“[A]micus Federation will in this brief seek to
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was to render more persuasive Harlan’s description of those interests, and
his resolution of the correct point of balance between them in section III.
The shared and central flaw of the main arguments presented by the
opposing parties, Harlan’s discussion indicates, was that they stated the
respective interests at stake in simple, abstract terms. The Poe appellants
offered the Court a range of arguments, but clearly signaled to the Court
that their central claim was that the contraception statute was sheerly
irrational when viewed as a means to any legitimate purpose. The amicus
brief filed in support of the married couple appellants focused even more
narrowly on the irrationality of the law given the facts as the amicus
presented them.
Framing the constitutional challenge in these terms fit the claim
within a pattern of analysis that the Court as an institution clearly accepted,
even if Justice Black thought it improper. Only six years before, in an
opinion written by Justice William O. Douglas—who purported to share
Black’s total incorporation theory—a unanimous Court entertained a due
process attack on a state law regulating the provision of eyeglasses that the
lower court concluded was “not ‘reasonably and rationally related to the
health and welfare of the people.’”166 Williamson v. Lee Optical rejected the
due process claim on its merits—“It is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.”—but Douglas’s opinion gave no
indication that the lower court’s analytical inquiry (is this a rational means
to serve public health and welfare?), as opposed to its conclusion, was
faulty.167 The appellants’ and amicus’s counsel were not unjustified in
thinking that precedent indicated that a due process challenge ought to be
framed as a denial that the Connecticut law was a rational means to
achieving the supposed public regarding end. That end, in Poe, was “the
judgment—implicit in this statute—that the use of contraceptives by
married couples is immoral.”168
The problem with the appellants’ argument, Justice Harlan
explained, was that a court could not properly conclude in the abstract that
the statute was sheerly irrational as a means of enforcing that moral
judgment. As Harlan had already noted, the constitutional tradition
recognized “the category of morality among state concerns” that a state
legislature can legitimately address, and the fact that in this instance the
demonstrate that no facts exist which can sustain this legislation.”). Cf. Brief for
Appellee in Poe v. Ullman, Nos. 60, 61 (O.T. 1960), at *6 (quoting Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)) (“‘The possession and enjoyment of all
rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing
authority . . . essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the
community.’”).
166. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955).
167. Id. at 488.
168. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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legislature was prohibiting private, consensual behavior could not therefore
exclude it, per se, from the legislature’s reach.169 More specifically, the
Connecticut statute was a regulation within “the area of sexual morality,
which contains many proscriptions of consensual behavior having little or
no direct impact on others,” and which gives rise to heated and conflicting
moral views.170 “[T]he very controversial nature of these questions [about
the morality of contraceptives] would, I think, require us to hesitate long
before concluding that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from
choosing as it has among these various views.”171 After all, a direct
prohibition on activity judged immoral can hardly be thought an irrational
means of enforcing morality, at least when viewed “simply, and in
abstraction,” as a question of logic.172
The state rested its primary defense of the statute on the law’s basis
in a legislative decision about morality. “When moral and welfare issues are
involved, a State has great latitude, and that a State has direct responsibility
over the morals and welfare of its people cannot be seriously questioned.
State Legislatures have, in many instances, passed laws in the moral field
which result in curtailing the range of conduct permitted to an
individual.”173 The legislature’s power to limit sexual activity on moral
grounds is particularly clear, “since marriage so affects the morals and
civilization of a people [that] its control and regulation is a matter of
domestic concern within each State,” and the legislature may “‘promote the
public morals’” by enacting laws that in its judgment “‘protect purity [and]
preserve chastity.’”174 Anticipating Harlan’s rebuttal to the appellants’
irrationality argument, the state pointed out that the morality and safety of
169. Id. at 545–46 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very inclusion of the
category of morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its
objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally
concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a
line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary would
be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal.”). Harlan acknowledged
that the traditional range of legitimate state legislative concerns includes morality
at the beginning of his constitutional discussion. See id. at 539 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (state legislation may address the “health, safety, morals or welfare of
its people”).
170. Id. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id. (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Certainly, Connecticut’s judgment is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect
than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on
adult consensual homosexuality, abortion, and sterilization, or euthanasia and
suicide.”).
172. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. Brief for Appellee in Poe v. Ullman, Nos. 60, 61 (O.T. 1960), at *9.
174. Id. at *8, *12 (quoting Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 62
(1917)).
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birth control was controversial, and that “the Connecticut legislature had to
make a choice between two divergent views.”175
But as with the appellants’ argument, Justice Harlan pointed out
that the state’s reasoning was too abstract to be convincing. Certainly, “the
laws regarding marriage which provide . . . when the sexual powers may be
used . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.”176 But the general proposition that states may express contestable
moral judgments in regulating sexual behavior, indisputable as he saw it,
could not establish the Connecticut statute’s validity because the law went
beyond expressing a moral judgment.
[A]s might be expected, we are not presented simply with
this moral judgment to be passed on as an abstract
proposition. The secular state is not an examiner of
consciences: it must operate in the realm of behavior, of
overt actions, and where it does so operate, not only the
underlying, moral purpose of its operations, but also the
choice of means becomes relevant to any Constitutional
judgment on what is done. The moral presupposition on
which appellants ask us to pass judgment could form the
basis of a variety of legal rules and administrative choices,
each presenting a different issue for adjudication.177
In other words, a due process challenge, however valid, should
neither be framed nor answered in general terms, or with abstractions. Due
process analysis must address the particular governmental action under
review, and the specific aspect of liberty that the challengers claim has been
infringed. Section II thus prepares the attentive reader to expect that
Harlan’s evaluation of the Connecticut law will turn on whether this
particular law’s specific impact on the practical scope of the married
couple’s liberty is a substantial and unjustifiable invasion of their privacy in
light of our constitutional tradition and the case law.
E. Due Process Analysis in the Harlan Mode
Section III opens by immediately dismissing general propositions
and assertions as the keys to due process reasoning. “Precisely what is
involved here is this,” Justice Harlan begins his analysis.178 In his view the
validity of the contraception prohibition turns neither on truisms about the

175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at *7.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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police power nor on abstract inquiries into the rationality of the law, but
instead on “the precise character of the enactment” before the Court.179
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting
the right to enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon
the most intimate details of the marital relation with the full
power of the criminal law. Potentially, this could allow the
deployment of all the incidental machinery of the criminal
law, arrests, searches and seizures; inevitably, it must mean
at the very least the lodging of criminal charges, a public
trial, and testimony as to the corpus delicti. Nor could any
imaginable elaboration of presumptions, testimonial
privileges, or other safeguards, alleviate the necessity for
testimony as to the mode and manner of the married
couples’ sexual relations, or at least the opportunity for the
accused to make denial of the charges. In sum, the statute
allows the State to enquire into, prove and punish married
people for the private use of their marital intimacy. This,
then, is the precise character of the enactment whose
Constitutional measure we must take.180
If we are rightly to evaluate this “new claim to Constitutional
protection,” we must start with a clear eyed understanding of the practical
sense in which the challenged law affects the liberty of the challengers.181
To uphold the Connecticut statute is not simply to affirm the broad scope of
state legislative authority or the existence of a logical connection between a
moral objection to birth control and a ban on contraceptives. The precise
issue before the Court was whether the statute may be applied to prosecute
and punish a married couple for an aspect of their sexual intimacy. Such a
judgment necessarily involves the further conclusion that the Constitution
“of our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual,” permits a state to use the brutal force of the criminal law
process—investigations, procedures, publicity, and the shame as well as
practical consequences of criminal conviction—in order to vindicate a
legislative majority’s views on a contested issue of private sexual
morality.182
It is easy enough to imagine an opinion by a different judge, one
not committed to Harlan’s ideals of common-law reasoning and
craftsmanship, that essentially ended its analysis with the paragraph just
quoted. Res ipsa loquitur: Surely the American Constitution cannot be
thought to permit the use of such extreme measures in the pursuit of a
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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governmental interest at once so ethereal and so broad in scope! But for
Harlan, specifying exactly what the constitutional question involved as a
practical matter was only the beginning of the due process analysis,
providing him not a conclusion, but an initial sense of how serious the
constitutional question was. Given the legislature’s decision to enforce its
moral choice through the harshest means possible, the criminal law—itself
a choice, as Harlan had pointed out183—the Connecticut “statute must pass
a more rigorous Constitutional test than that merely going to the plausibility
of its underlying rationale” and must “be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny.’”184

183. See id. at 547–48 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the “variety of legal
rules” that “readily suggest themselves” as means to achieve the legislature’s end).
184. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). It would be anachronistic to read Harlan as invoking the
compelling interest/narrow tailoring strict scrutiny formula that the Court
eventually developed as the standard of review for certain constitutional claims. In
the Skinner v. Oklahoma opinion of the Court that Harlan quoted, Justice Douglas
used the phrase “strict scrutiny” to qualify “the large deference” ordinarily
accorded legislative distinctions: because the law under review provided for the
sterilization of certain repeat criminal defendants but not others, and thus
irreversibly deprived those affected of “one of the basic civil rights of man,” the
statutory discrimination could not be upheld on the basis of “neat legal
distinctions” along “conspicuously artificial lines.” Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42.
Douglas was insisting that the Court should take a close look, not identifying a
formal pattern of analysis. Harlan borrowed his words to make the same point,
which he had earlier phrased as “particularly careful scrutiny.” Poe, 367 U.S. at
543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The reader should be aware, however, that Harlan’s
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), was an important step in the evolution of the now-familiar strict scrutiny
formula. In that case, having concluded that the state’s demand that the NAACP
disclose its membership lists would compromise the members’ “constitutionally
protected right of association,” Harlan proceeded to ask whether the state had an
interest in disclosure weighty enough to justify limitation of the right. Id. at 463.
“Such ‘a subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.’” Id. (internal
citation omitted). As with the word “strict,” I believe Harlan intended his reference
to a “compelling” interest to be an observation about the demanding nature of the
proper judicial inquiry rather than code for a specific, formalized analytical
requirement. It is not uncommon in constitutional law for a vivid expression to
harden into a test or part of one. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
558–59 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the
opinion of the Court for “introducing an element of uncertainty” by referring to the
government’s burden not only in traditional terms but also by the phrase
“exceedingly persuasive justification. That phrase is best confined, as it was first
used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a
formulation of the test itself.”), with Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678,
1690 (2017) (“Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of
gender, we have reiterated, requires an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’”).
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This flat pronouncement about the necessity of “strict scrutiny”
parallels two observations Harlan made earlier in his opinion. First, that “a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must [recognize] that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment” and second, that the Connecticut statute “unquestionably”
deprived the married couple “of a substantial measure of liberty in carrying
on the most intimate of all personal relationships.”185 But on what basis
does Harlan assume that the reader has to agree? Viewed in isolation, these
statements might suggest that at a crucial juncture Harlan’s analysis rests on
a personal moral or political judgment announced ipse dixit—precisely what
Black charged was true of Harlan-style due process. But the reader will
recall Harlan’s insistence that due process analysis does not leave
judges,including himself,“free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them.”186 The judge must instead look for the point of balance “which
our Nation”—not the individual judge—“has struck between liberty and
“the demands of organized society . . . having regard to what history
teaches [including] the traditions from which [“this country”] developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke.”187 It would contradict his basic
account of due process if Harlan’s personal moral intuitions dictated his
constitutional conclusion.
Read in context, however, I think it clear that Harlan’s assertion
about “strict scrutiny” and other similar comments are not signs of a fatal
self-contradiction in his thinking.188 To be sure, in these statements there is
an element of appeal to the reader’s personal experience and common sense
judgment about the character of the statute’s intrusiveness. Harlan’s
insistence that his understanding of due process does not give free rein to
personal and even intuitive evaluations does not entail the wholesale
rejection of a positive role for such evaluations. In part, this reflects the
inevitable role any judge’s personality and character will play in his or her
thinking precisely because he or she is thinking.189 More crucially, however,
185. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543, 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 543, 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ( “[A] reasonable and sensitive
judgment must” recognize that some aspects of liberty “require particularly careful
scrutiny” when the state interferes, and that the state law “unquestionably”
deprived the married couple “of a substantial measure of liberty . . . .”) (emphases
added). See also id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Connecticut statute
“create[s] a crime which is grossly offensive to . . . privacy.”).
189. As Harlan later would write in Griswold, a judge properly making a
constitutional decision must consider “the teachings of history [and] the basic
values that underlie our society” and display a “wise appreciation” for federalism,
separation of powers, and their relationship to “American freedoms.” Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
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Harlan assumed that the moral intuitions that inform a conscientious and
competent judge’s reasoning are not “‘merely personal and private’” but
“‘deeply rooted in reason’” as understood in and by “‘the compelling
traditions of the legal profession.’”190 What is phrased as ipse dixit is in
reality an appeal to moral intuitions that Harlan assumes his reader will
share because the intuitions themselves are shaped by the social and,
perhaps even more importantly, professional traditions that are common to
writer and reader.
Harlan therefore followed his rejection of mere plausibility as the
appropriate “Constitutional test” for the Connecticut law by invoking the
backdrop of Anglo-American legal traditions against which the statute’s
problematic validity was clear. “This enactment involves what, by common
understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to
be a most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in its
most basic sense, and it is this that requires that the statute be subjected to
‘strict scrutiny.’”191 “[C]ommon understanding throughout the Englishspeaking world” is of course a broader concept than “English-speaking
legal tradition.” Judge and reader share necessarily share a common culture
to the extent that they are members of a professional tradition within that
culture. But as Harlan immediately went on to discuss, it is the professional,
lawyerly understanding of liberty and privacy that Harlan primarily had in
mind.
By this point, the reader—mine as well as Harlan’s—will feel no
surprise that Harlan began his examination of “the privacy of the home in
its most basic sense” by dealing with different perspectives from his own.192
Describing the Connecticut law’s intrusion on liberty in terms of the
privacy of the home posed two immediate problems for the plaintiffs’
claim. First, “the concept of the privacy of the home receives explicit
Constitutional protection in two places only,” the Third and Fourth
Amendments.193 Second, the Connecticut statute “does not invade [that]
privacy in the usual sense” addressed by the text of the Fourth Amendment,
which “refers only to methods of ferreting out substantive wrongs, and . . .
presupposes that substantive offenses may be committed and sought out in
the privacy of the home.”194 The substantive offense the Connecticut law
created did not intrinsically call for otherwise unlawful searches—and had
nothing to do with housing soldiers! A textualist of the Black school,
therefore, would likely conclude that the law could be enforced even
against a married couple without raising constitutional doubts as long as the
190. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544–45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952)).
191. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942)).
193. Id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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police obtained a particularized search warrant supported by probable
cause.
Harlan made short work of these objections as inconsistent with
both the Court’s decisions and the McCulloch understanding of
constitutional law. He pointed out that on the same day it announced its
decision in Poe, the Court handed down its decision in Mapp v. Ohio,
restating its long-standing view that “the concept of ‘privacy’ embodied in
the Fourth Amendment is part of the ‘ordered liberty’ assured against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment” due process clause.195 The
observation that the Connecticut statute did not fall within the letter of the
Fourth Amendment “forecloses any claim to Constitutional protection
against this form of deprivation of privacy, only if due process in this
respect is limited to what is explicitly provided in the Constitution, divorced
from the rational purposes, historical roots, and subsequent developments
of the relevant provisions.”196 This was a barren understanding of the
Fourth Amendment itself that the Court had rejected. And rightly so.
Textualism’s refusal to take account of constitutional purposes, history, and
the development of doctrine is an inadequate approach to the text itself, a
failure to recall with Marshall that “it is a constitution we are
expounding.”197
Having reminded the reader once again that enforcing the
Constitution’s text demands not the reduction of the document to its
discrete linguistic parts, but rather the discernment of its overarching
themes and purposes, Harlan began his affirmative discussion of the
privacy that due process protects by quoting Justice Brandeis’s well-known
dissent in Olmstead v. United States.198 Olmstead’s specific holding was
that a warrantless, non-intrusive wiretap by federal officials did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. However, Harlan invoked Brandeis not for his
specific objection to that ruling, but for what Harlan termed “[p]erhaps the
most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty” underlying
privacy decisions such as Mapp.199
195. Id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650 (1961)). The opinion of the Court in Mapp repeatedly referred to “the right to
[or “of”] privacy.” See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650–57, 660, n.7.
196. Poe, 367 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
197. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
198. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
199. The Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. New York, 389 U.S.
347, 350–51, n.6 (1967), in an opinion that nonetheless appeared to reject without
mention Brandeis’s broad language (“the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated
into a general ‘right to privacy’”) (citing a famous article co-authored by Brandeis
“on the right to be let alone” in a sentence stating that this right is “left largely to”
state law). Harlan joined the Court’s opinion but wrote a separate concurrence that
implicitly disagreed with the Court’s narrow view of the constitutional status of
privacy. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that Fourth Amendment
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The protection guaranteed by the (Fourth and Fifth)
Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.200
Some of the significance of this passage for Harlan’s argument may
have rested in Brandeis’s insistence that “right to be let alone” protects
feelings, emotions, and the “spiritual nature” of persons in addition to more
tangible interests.201 But by beginning his argument about the
Constitution’s protection of the privacy of the marital home with a
statement of constitutional principle not limited to marriage, the home, or
privacy in a literal sense, Harlan’s opinion once again linked his due
process reasoning to Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch. Traditional
constitutional analysis reaches very specific conclusions (Congress can
create a national bank) from very general principles (“Let the end be
legitimate . . . .”).202
Constitutional law cannot remain at the level of general principles,
however crucial it is that constitutional lawyers reason from such
principles. As we saw above, Harlan identified abstraction as the common
error of the parties in Poe, and the paragraphs of his dissent following the
Olmstead quotation connect Brandeis’s grand rhetoric to the question of the
contraception statute’s validity through several steps. First, Harlan
connected the general concept of a “right to be left alone” with the specific
protection extends to circumstances in which the individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
200. Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
201. Id. at 549–50 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
202. McCulloch invoked a cornucopia of general principles on its way to
concluding that the national bank was constitutional. For Marshall’s familiar
formulation of the relationship of ends and means in analyzing the scope of
Congress’s implied powers, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819).
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idea of the privacy of the home. Citations to other opinions that he
summarized as “amply show[ing] that the Constitution protects the privacy
of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character”
demonstrated that Harlan’s association of liberty, privacy, and the home
was a long-standing theme in the Court’s decisions.203 That line of
decisions in turn rebutted any textualist complaint that the only
constitutional references to domestic privacy, the Third and Fourth
Amendments, are discrete prohibitions on specific modes of physically
invading the home. “It would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing
substance to form” to limit “the Constitutional principle of privacy against
arbitrary official intrusion” to the “two particular threats to that principle”
that the founders had confronted.204 “‘A principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.’”205 The
Third and Fourth Amendments evidence the Constitution’s solicitude for
the principle of sanctity of the home by addressing two egregious ways the
principle was invaded in the late Eighteenth Century.
Harlan’s second step was to explain the sense in which the
Connecticut law impinged on the principle of domestic privacy despite the
fact that the statute did not in terms authorize or require the physical
invasion of anyone’s home, which he conceded might be argued to be the
concern of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments’ ban on unreasonable
searches. Harlan had already established to his satisfaction that “it is the
purpose of [express constitutional] guarantees, and not their text” that
governs due process analysis.206 In his judgment, therefore, any argument
203. Poe, 367 U.S. at 550–51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Harlan
quoted Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885), which helpfully provided
a link between broad language similar to Brandeis’s and what the older opinion
called “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” and Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), which stated that the “security of one’s privacy
against arbitrary intrusion . . . is basic to a free society.” The reader who tracks
down the additional pinpoint citations discovers that Harlan is drawing his or her
attention to similar language in other opinions of the Court. See Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 365 (1959) (“[T]he broad constitutional proscription of official invasion
[protects] the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy, the right to
shut the door on officials of the state . . . .”); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
587 (1946) (referring to “protection of the privacy of the individual, his right to be
let alone”); Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202–03 (1946)
(“[I]ntru[sion] upon different areas of privacy . . . has brought forth some of the
stoutest and most effective instances of [judicial] resistance . . . .”).
204. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 317, 349 (1910)).
206. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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that the Constitution’s protection of the home’s privacy is limited to the
narrowest reading of the Fourth Amendment’s words would be “so
insubstantial as to be captious.”207
[H]ere we have not an intrusion into the home so much as
on the life which characteristically has its place in the
home. But . . . if the physical curtilage of the home is
protected, it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect the
privacies of the life within. Certainly the safeguarding of
the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of
property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the
seat of family life.208
At the core of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusion of unjustifiable
governmental invasion of the physical home is a broader recognition of
“‘the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,’”209 a
recognition “so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection
the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.”210
Harlan briefly presented his crucial third step, identifying respect
for the intimate life of the married couple as specifically required by due
process, as resting on a virtually self-evident and fundamental aspect of the
constitutional protection of domestic privacy. Harlan states:
Of this whole “private realm of family life” it is difficult to
imagine what is more private or more intimate than a
husband and wife’s marital relations. We would indeed be
straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel were we to
show concern for the niceties of property law involved in
our recent decision, under the Fourth Amendment,

207. Id. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
210. Id. at 551–52 (Harlan, J., dissenting). To illustrate this point, Harlan
quoted Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335–36
(1920) (statute forbidding parents to teach pacifism to their children “invades the
privacy and freedom of the home”), and cited the Meyer and Pierce education
decisions he discussed earlier. By 1961, all three opinions would most naturally be
taken to make First Amendment arguments, although Brandeis rooted his position
in the “rights, privileges, and immunities of . . . a citizen of the United States,”
whereas the other cases invoked due process. From Harlan’s perspective, the
uncertain textual basis for the arguments only reinforced his claim that the
Constitution’s purposes, rather than the details of its express prohibitions, should
govern the due process analysis.
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in Chapman v. United States, and yet fail at least to see any
substantial claim here.211
The central purpose of the Constitution’s protection of the privacy of the
home is to ensure governmental respect for the social, emotional, and
spiritual importance of the family in the American political community, and
constitutional law can and should express that respect in effective legal
terms.
Harlan spent more time answering the obvious rejoinder that
privacy “manifestly is not an absolute,” and that every state’s law regulated
sexual behavior, “however privately practiced,” in multiple ways that no
one in 1961 would think unconstitutional.212 Harlan implicitly equated that
hypothesized objection with the state’s actual argument in Poe. It started
from a general, abstract proposition—state legislative power reaches issues
of morality—to draw a specific conclusion—the state may punish the use of
contraceptives by a married couple—without taking any account of the
circumstances that took the specific instance out of the general proposition.
A more precise analysis would note that the “traditional offenses against
good morals” concern behavior that the state can forbid altogether, while
“the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of marriage.”213 The question in Poe was not whether the state can
enforce limitations on sexual behavior simpliciter, but whether the
Constitution allows the state “having acknowledged a marriage and the
intimacies inherent in it . . . undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy.”214 When the constitutional question Poe
presented is stated with precision, Harlan thought it clear that “the
appellants have presented a very pressing claim for Constitutional
protection.” 215
As Harlan had written earlier, in a case involving a serious
argument that an important aspect of liberty is at stake, “a reasonable and
sensitive judgment . . . require[s] particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify” the government’s action, and so he turned finally
to consider what might justify the imposition of criminal sanctions on the
use of contraception even by married persons.216 By this standard, the state
211. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)). Chapman invalidated a warrantless search of rented
premises because the Court concluded that, under the relevant state’s law, the
landlord who had consented to the search was not legally entitled to do so. 365 U.S.
at 616–17. Harlan joined the opinion of the Court.
212. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 543, 554–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan repeated his previous
statement that in such a case, the Constitution requires more than a mere rational
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had in essence conceded the law’s invalidity since it had made no argument
“even remotely suggest[ing] a justification for the obnoxiously intrusive
means it has chosen to effectuate [its moral] policy.”217 But Harlan did not
rest his conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional on waiver grounds.
The state’s non-enforcement of the law, he reasoned, undercut any possible
claim that the Connecticut government actually treated the state’s moral
interest as important, while the statute’s uniquely harsh nature when
compared to the laws of other states and countries supported his judgment
that a law criminalizing a married couple’s use of contraceptives is
inconsistent with freedom.218
Due process analysis, as Justice Harlan portrayed it in Poe, does
not involve the subordination of American governmental actions to
individual judges’ idiosyncratic moral compasses. In deciding whether to
accept or reject a due process claim, the judge’s obligation is to reach the
decision that best maintains “the balance which our Nation . . . has struck
between [personal] liberty and the demands of organized society.”219
Harlan’s discussion therefore paid careful attention to Supreme Court
precedent and to the ideas connecting the Court’s decisions. But since there
is no formula for finding the constitutional balance between liberty and
society, no code containing a list of predetermined right answers, on
Harlan’s view the rational process through which the judge reaches that
decision necessarily involves the exercise of the individual’s personal
judgment. Section III of his discussion of the Connecticut statute’s validity
is a sustained attempt to demonstrate that Harlan’s judgment is a persuasive
application of long-standing themes in the Supreme Court’s case law, but it
makes no effort to deny that the judgment is John Marshall Harlan’s and
not the presentation of an undeniable fact. The last two sentences in
Harlan’s substantive discussion illustrate the interplay of the objective and
the subjective in his due process thinking.
I must agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that “[t]here are
limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented
relationship between the government action and “the effectuation of a proper state
purpose.” Id. at 554 (citing his earlier discussion at 542–45).
217. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 554–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“To me the very circumstance
that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute against
individual users, while it nevertheless persists in asserting its right to do so at any
time . . . conduces to the inference either that it does not consider the policy of the
statute a very important one, or that it does not regard the means it has chosen for
its effectuation or necessary. But conclusive in my view, is the utter novelty of this
enactment. . . . Indeed, a diligent search has revealed that no nation, including
several which quite evidently shared Connecticut’s moral policy, has seen fit to
effectuate that policy by the means presented here.”) (footnote omitted).
219. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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majority may conduct . . . experiments at the expense of the
dignity and personality” of the individual. In this instance
these limits are, in my view, reached and passed.220
In quoting the redoubtable Jackson’s concurrence in Skinner, a
precedent that played a significant role earlier in his opinion,221 Harlan
reminded the reader once more that to be persuasive, a novel constitutional
argument must “depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted
principles and criteria [and] take ‘its place in relation to what went
before.’”222 But he did so in terms that acknowledged the role of his
personal judgment, and indeed of Jackson’s, in the particular constitutional
conclusions they reached in Skinner and Poe.
F. Why Did Justice Harlan Discuss the Merits in Poe?
Like Justice Harlan, his colleagues in the majority of Poe v. Ullman
also thought it important that Connecticut prosecutors had no history of
prosecuting married couples for violating the contraceptives ban, but they
ascribed a very different significance to the fact than did Harlan. Justice
Frankfurter thought that “[e]ighty years of Connecticut history demonstrate
a . . . tacit agreement [not to prosecute under the law]. The fact that
Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute deprives
these controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition of
constitutional adjudication.”223 The statute, in other words, was essentially a
dead letter that posed no practical threat either to the married plaintiffs or to
the physician plaintiff, and as such, their claims were non-justiciable. In
response, Part One of Harlan’s dissent, entitled “Justiciability,” explained
why he thought the Court ought to reach the merits, and did so at some
length. We will not linger over the technical arguments in Part One,224
220. Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
221. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
223. Id. at 507–08 (Frankfurter, J.) (plurality opinion) (discussing the claim of
the married couple plaintiffs). Cf. id. at 508 (as to the physician plaintiff, “we
cannot accept, as the basis of constitutional adjudication, other than as chimerical
the fear of enforcement of provisions that have during so many years gone
uniformly and without exception unenforced.”); id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“The true controversy in this case is over the opening of birth-control clinics on a
large scale; it is that which the State has prevented in the past, not the use of
contraceptives by isolated and individual married couples.”).
224. Harlan’s discussion of justiciability carefully parsed different
justiciability themes and precedents, employing what will be to my reader his nowfamiliar technique of discussing so he could reject doctrines and principles that he
thought did not apply. See id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is well to proceed
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convincing though I believe them to be, but Harlan’s explanation in Part
One of why he wrote Part Two on “Constitutionality” sheds further light on
his understanding and application of due process.
The problem, as Harlan acknowledged, was that the majority’s
decision to dismiss the lawsuit rather than adjudicate the constitutional
claim made it seem odd or even inappropriate for a dissenting Justice to
discuss the merits. In fact, doing so appeared to prejudge a future case
involving the same issue.225 Justices Black and Stewart, who also thought
Poe justiciable, did not address the substantive question in the case, and
Harlan thought it important to indicate why he did not likewise abstain.226
Regrettably, an adequate exposition of my views calls for a
dissenting opinion of unusual length . . . . While ordinarily
to a disclosure of those [justiciability limitations] which are not involved in the
present appeals . . . .”). As to “the precise failing in these proceedings which is said
to justify refusal to exercise our mandatory appellate jurisdiction: that there has
been but one recorded Connecticut case dealing with a prosecution under the
statute,” Harlan pointed out that “the very purpose of [that one] prosecution was to
change defiance [of the statute] into compliance,” with apparent in terrorem
success. Id. at 531, 534. The result of the majority’s decision not to address the
constitutional claim thus was to enable the state “to maintain at least some measure
of compliance with this statute and still obviate any review in this Court, by the
device of purely discretionary prosecutorial inactivity. . . . All that stands between
the appellants and jail is the legally unfettered whim of the prosecutor and the
Constitutional issue this Court today refuses to decide.” Id. at 537–38 (order of
quotations altered).
225. Professor Fried, a great–and admiring–student of Harlan as judge, has
expressed reservations about Harlan’s decision to discuss the merits. See Charles
Fried, A Meditation on the First Principles of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1227, 1239 (2004) (“I am not sure that was the right thing to do. The majority had
not expressed a view on the merits. After the Court’s disposition, they were not part
of the case, so what Justice Harlan did was once again to commit himself to a
position that could be (and was) relevant in future cases, but in a context where it
could not control the result in this case.”). Fried’s concern is a serious one, but for
the reason expressed in the text I think Harlan justified his choice.
226. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice BLACK
dissents because he believes that the constitutional questions should be reached and
decided.”); id. at 555 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Since the appeals are nonetheless
dismissed, my dissent need go no further. However, in refraining from a discussion
of the constitutional issues, I in no way imply that the ultimate result I would reach
on the merits of these controversies would differ from the conclusions of my
dissenting Brothers.”). Stewart ultimately did reach a different conclusion on the
merits than Harlan. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). As Stewart’s reference to dissenting “Brothers” indicated,
Douglas also reached the merits, but Douglas, a less punctilious judge than Harlan,
did not indicate any concern about the propriety of opining on the substantive
constitutional question. See id.
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I would not deem it appropriate to deal, in dissent, with
Constitutional issues which the Court has not reached, I
shall do so here because such issues, as I see things, are
entangled with the Court’s conclusion as to the
nonjusticiability of these appeals.227
Harlan’s somewhat surprising phrasing—one might expect “the
constitutional issues are entangled with my conclusion as to
justiciability”—foreshadows an important theme in his subsequent
discussion of constitutionality. Namely, that the due process inquiry, if
done correctly, involves a precise definition of the claim of liberty being
examined. To put it another way, the majority’s failure to comprehend the
true nature of the liberty at stake directly contributed to its mistaken
conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable. But in what way?
In summarizing his argument why the Supreme Court should
dismiss Poe, Justice Frankfurter wrote that it was unnecessary for the Court
to exercise its jurisdiction “in order to protect appellants from the hazards
of prosecution,” because they faced no realistic danger of being exposed to
those hazards including the final hazard, the risk of conviction under a law
they thought unconstitutional.228 Justice Harlan’s response was that “it
misconceives . . . the nature of these appellants’ rights to say that the failure
of the State to carry through any criminal prosecution requires dismissal of
their appeals.”229 All Frankfurter’s assertion could actually mean was that
“as a matter of prediction, [the state was] unlikely to decide to prosecute.”
But the liberty protected by due process is not a chimerical “freedom” from
ultimate government sanction that can be exercised only by playing the
odds and acting at one’s peril.
As I will develop later in this opinion, the most substantial
claim which these married persons press is their right to
enjoy the privacy of their marital relations free of the
enquiry of the criminal law, whether it be in a prosecution
of them or of a doctor whom they have consulted. And I
cannot agree that their enjoyment of this privacy is not
substantially impinged upon, when they are told that if they
use contraceptives, indeed whether they do so or not, the
only thing which stands between them and being forced to
render criminal account of their marital privacy is the whim
of the prosecutor.230

227.
228.
229.
230.

Poe, 367 U.S. at 523–24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 535 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 535–36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Constitution’s protection of marital privacy, Harlan will
“develop later,” does not merely guarantee an ultimately favorable outcome
in the event of a prosecution. To protect the life of the home in a truly
meaningful way, due process must safeguard the intensely private and
emotional intimacy of marital sexual expression against unjustified
governmental invasion. To do so entails not just protection against
punishment for its exercise, but also immunity from the deep injury that
governmental investigation and examination would cause,231 and indeed
from the anxiety and restraint that the fear of criminal law consequences
alone might impose.232 The privacy of the marital home is substantially
impaired by the existence of a law with such consequences.
The majority’s refusal to address the constitutional claim in Poe
was thus, for Harlan, in practical effect a rejection of that claim, and its
failure to understand that fact was intrinsic to its conclusion that the case
should be dismissed. Harlan therefore needed to address the merits in order
fully to demonstrate the majority’s error on justiciability. And in turn,
Harlan’s discussion of that preliminary issue in Part One of his dissent
foreshadowed and undergirded his explanation in Part Two of the nature
and substantiality of the liberty at stake.
II. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT: GRISWOLD V.
CONNECTICUT
A little less than five months after the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeals in Poe v. Ullman, Planned Parenthood opened a birth control clinic
in New Haven, Connecticut, with Dr. Lee Buxton, the physician plaintiff in
Poe, as medical director.233 Within ten days, the state authorities arrested
Buxton and Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Connecticut Planned
Parenthood. Buxton and Griswold were subsequently convicted of aiding
and abetting married women in violating the state ban on the use of
contraceptives.234 As the state supreme court laconically observed, “[t]he
231. The Constitution, Harlan promised to show, entitled the married plaintiffs
to protection against “the substantial damage [that would] be accomplished by such
a prosecution whatever its outcome in the state courts or here.” See id. at 537.
232. See id. at 538–39 (“I cannot regard as less present, or less real [than the
injury found sufficient in Pierce v. Society of Sisters], the tendency to discourage
the exercise of the liberties of these appellants, caused by reluctance to submit their
freedoms from prosecution and conviction to the discretion of the Connecticut
prosecuting authorities.”) The statute invalidated in Pierce was “not even to
become effective for more than seventeen months after the time the case was
argued to this Court” but the Court found that “allegations of present loss of
business, caused by the threat of . . . future enforcement . . . sufficient” to make the
case justiciable. Id. at 538 (discussing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536
(1925)).
233. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
234. Id.
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principal offenders were not prosecuted.”235 After the state courts once
again upheld the statute’s constitutionality, the defendants appealed their
conviction to the Supreme Court, which unanimously accepted their
standing to assert the rights of “principal offenders” and held the statute
unconstitutional, with Justices Black and Stewart dissenting.236
The justices in the majority in Griswold did not all agree on the
rationale for their conclusion. At the Court’s post-argument conference
discussing the case, Justice Douglas advocated invalidating the statute on
First Amendment freedom of association grounds, along the lines of his Poe
dissent. Justice Black, according to another Justice’s notes, made fun of that
idea, stating “right of association is for me right of assembly & right of
husband & wife to assemble in bed is new right of assembly to me.”237
When Chief Justice Warren assigned the writing of the opinion to Douglas,
the senior associate justice in the majority, the latter nonetheless drafted an
opinion on First Amendment grounds.
Marriage does not fit precisely any of the categories of
First Amendment rights. But it is a form of association as
vital in the life of a man or woman as any other, and
perhaps more so. We would, indeed, have difficulty
protecting the intimacies of one’s relations to NAACP and
not the intimacies of one’s marriage relation . . . .
[Marriage] flourishes on the interchange of ideas [and its
objects] are the end products of free expression.238
Before circulating it to the Court as a whole, Douglas sent the draft to
Justice William Brennan, who strongly urged Douglas not to rely solely on
the First Amendment. Douglas accepted the advice but made minimal
adjustments to his original draft.239
The result was an uneasy compromise. In the published opinion, the
old New Dealer Douglas vehemently denied that the decision was a return
to Lochner-style substantive due process, and cited a barrage of Bill of
Rights provisions as, apparently, the collective textual source of a
constitutional right combining associational and privacy freedom.240 While
235. State v. Griswold, 200 A.2d 479, 479 (Conn. 1964).
236. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480–81.
237. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN
COURT 229, 237 (1985) (discussing the Court’s internal deliberations).
238. Id. at 235 (from Justice Douglas’s original draft).
239. See id. at 237–38.
240. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82 (“[W]e are met with a wide range of
questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of New York should be
our guide. But we decline that invitation . . . .”) (citation omitted); id. at 484
(explaining that “[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
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four other justices nominally joined Douglas’s effort, the plethora of
filings—every member of the Court except Justice Clark either wrote or
joined a separate opinion—indicates the breadth of discomfort with
Douglas’s opinion.241 But it was the opinions of Black and Harlan that most
directly carry on the discussion Harlan initiated in Poe.242
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen” and going on to mention the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
241. In addition to the opinions discussed in the text, Justice Goldberg, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan, filed a concurrence best known for its
discussion of the Ninth Amendment, but clearly an exercise in due process
reasoning strongly reminiscent of Lochner-era decisions even if somewhat
reflective of Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent. Compare id. at 486 (“the concept of
liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental”), with id. at 495 (“This
Court recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska that the right ‘to marry, establish a home
and bring up children’ was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citation omitted), and id. at 494–95 (stating that “Mr.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, comprehensively
summarized the principles underlying the Constitution's guarantees of privacy”)
(quoting Brandeis and Harlan in Poe) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice White
thought that “the State claims but one justification for its anti-use statute . . . to
serve the State’s policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual
relationships . . . .”, and on that basis concluded that the law was sheerly irrational.
See id. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stewart, who also
joined Justice Black’s dissent, accused White and Harlan of wrongly attempting to
revive Lochner and Goldberg of “turn[ing] somersaults with history.” See id. at 529
(Stewart, J. dissenting). Like Justice Black, Justice Stewart found unconvincing
Douglas’s attempt to rest the Court’s judgment on a combination of Bill of Rights
provisions. Id. at 528 (“As to the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, I can
find nothing in any of them to invalidate this Connecticut law”).
242. As I noted earlier, Harlan’s Poe analysis has supplanted Douglas’s
opinion as providing the rationale for the judgment in Griswold. The failure of
Douglas’s opinion to wear well is unsurprising given his minimalist approach to
lessening its reliance on the First Amendment: in its final form the opinion can
hardly be accused of being tightly-reasoned, and it has also suffered from
generations of law professors mocking Douglas’s assertion that “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Id. at 484. That sentence, which
Douglas added in his grudging redraft, is oddly phrased (either “penumbras” or
“emanations” needed to go!) but the idea that constitutional provisions should often
be given broader effect than a narrow reading of their text would require is hardly
bizarre – indeed, as we have seen it is a central theme in Harlan’s reasoning in Poe.
Even the term “penumbra” as shorthand for this principle has the imprimatur of
Holmes, whose opinion in Olmstead Douglas may have been recalling, perhaps
subconsciously. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S., 438, 469 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to “the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments” and asserting that “Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them”). A
more-carefully constructed opinion arguing that the Bill of Rights should be read as
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Black’s dissent dealt gently with his frequent ally Douglas’s
opinion, at one point suggesting that Douglas’s opinion was simply a
mistaken application of common First Amendment principles. His primary
criticism was that Douglas’s reliance on the idea of a “right of privacy” was
inconsistent with Douglas’s insistence that his reasoning could find a proper
textual basis in the “emanations” of several amendments.243 Black’s major
concern was with the separate concurrences, which he described as revivals
of Lochner and thus direct challenges to his claim that his textualism was
constitutional orthodoxy.244 Black spent several pages disparaging
Goldberg’s Ninth Amendment argument as novel and indeed “shocking,”
but made little attempt otherwise to address the details of the concurring
justices’ arguments, and he studiously ignored Harlan’s Griswold opinion
almost entirely.245 Black’s discussion of textualism and its allegedly
a coherent whole that is broader than its individual provisions read separately might
have proven influential, although such an argument would differ little from
Harlan’s understanding of due process.
243. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510–11 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I have no
doubt that the Connecticut law could be applied in such a way as to abridge
freedom of speech and press and therefore violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. My disagreement with the Court's opinion holding that there is such
a violation here is a narrow one, relating to the application of the First Amendment
to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.”); id. at 508 (“The Court talks
about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there is some constitutional
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge
the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not.”); id. at 509–10 (“I get nowhere in
this case by talk about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as an emanation from one
or more constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I
am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”).
244. See id. at 511 (“But my disagreement with Brothers HARLAN, WHITE
and GOLDBERG is more basic. . . . I discuss the due process and Ninth
Amendment arguments together because on analysis they turn out to be the same
thing—merely using different words to claim for this Court and the federal
judiciary power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational,
unreasonable or offensive.”); id. at 514–15 (“Of the cases on which my Brothers
WHITE and GOLDBERG rely so heavily, undoubtedly the reasoning of two of
them supports their result here—as would that of a number of others which they do
not bother to name, e.g., Lochner v. New York. . . . The two they do cite and quote
from, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, were both decided in
opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds which elaborated the same natural law due
process philosophy found in Lochner v. New York”) (citations omitted); id. at 523
n.18 (“Brother HARLAN . . . has consistently stated his belief in the power of
courts to strike down laws which they consider arbitrary or unreasonable, see, e.g.,
Poe v. Ullman (dissenting opinion)”) (citation omitted).
245. See id. at 518–20 (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing Ninth Amendment
argument). Justice Black also joined Justice Stewart’s dissent, and thus his
criticisms of Goldberg. See also id. at 510 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that
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“natural law” antithesis repeated at some length the arguments he had long
been making. But his dissent can nonetheless be read interestingly as an
oblique response to Harlan’s opinion in Poe.
Harlan, as the reader knows, insisted in Poe that “the supplying of
content to th[e] Constitutional concept” of due process is “not one where
judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them .
. . . ‘We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions.’”246
Black’s rejoinder in Griswold was that a judge following Harlan’s view has
nowhere else to derive the content he imports into the due process clause
other than speculation and personal notions about justice. If the Court
adopted Harlan’s approach, Black repeatedly asserted, it would “require
judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own
appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary” or “which offend their
notions of natural justice.”247 A judge who would invalidate a law as an
“arbitrary” interference with a “fundamental” but unwritten constitutional
liberty is fooling himself, perhaps “‘quite innocently,’” since his “‘personal
preferences . . . are all that in fact lie behind the decision.’”248 “Perhaps the
clearest, frankest and briefest explanation of how this due process approach
works is the statement in another case handed down today that this Court is
to invoke the Due Process Clause to strike down state procedures or laws

Justice Harlan’s “views are spelled out at greater length in his dissenting opinion in
Poe”) (citation omitted).
246. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1952)).
247. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511–12, n.4 (Black, J. dissenting) (emphases
added). See also id. at 519 (criticizing Goldberg’s claim that in due process/Ninth
Amendment analysis, “judges will not consider ‘their personal and private notions.’
One may ask how they can avoid considering them.”); id. at 521 (invalidating laws
based on “the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable,
unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational” is to adopt “a loose, flexible,
uncontrolled standard” for decisions); id. at 522 (describing Lochner as “based on
subjective considerations of ‘natural justice,’ [that are] no less dangerous when
used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than those about economic
rights”); id. at 523 (in rejecting Lochner, the Supreme Court returned to “the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies”); id. at 523 n.18 (citing
Harlan’s Poe dissent as demonstrating Harlan’s belief that courts can “strike down
laws which they consider arbitrary or unreasonable”); id. at 525–26 (substantive
due process leaves judges to “roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs
as to reasonableness and actually select policies”); id. at 526 (quoting Learned
Hand to assert that substantive due process amounts to “rule[] by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians”).
248. Id. at 513 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 70 (1958)).
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which it can ‘not tolerate.’”249 Black’s textualism is the cure for the radical
subjectivity of Harlan’s due process.
Unlike Black, Harlan felt no need to discuss his general approach to
due process adjudication or detail his thinking about the Connecticut
statute, having stated them “at length in [his] dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman.”250 He briefly explained “the proper constitutional inquiry in this
case [as] whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”251 The most interesting aspect
of that statement, which quoted Justice Cardozo’s well-known opinion for
the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, is that Harlan chose to summarize his
Poe inquiry in words he did not use in Poe. In his earlier opinion, Harlan
cited Palko, but not for the expression he quoted in Griswold, and he did
not refer to “basic values” at all. The point, as the reader knows, is that
Harlan did not think due process reasoning can be reduced to a formula.
Harlan focused most of his attention in his brief opinion on
rebutting Black’s claim that the latter’s textualism was the cure for the
resort to personal preference Black attributed to Harlan.252 Harlan made two

249. Id. at 511 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 631 (1965)). Black’s quotation of Linkletter as a description of anyone’s
understanding of due process analysis, much less Harlan’s, was unfair. Linkletter
held that Mapp v. Ohio’s extension of the exclusionary rule to state cases did not
apply retroactively, and in reviewing search and seizure decisions leading up to
Mapp, Justice Clark’s opinion of the Court mentioned that in Rochin v. California,
“the Court could not tolerate the procedure involved” (the introduction of evidence
derived by forcibly pumping the stomach of the accused). See Linkletter, 381 U.S.
at 631, 640. Justice Clark was in fact a critic of Rochin–the year before Griswold,
he joined the part of a separate opinion by Justice Black that attacked Rochin as an
example of the illicit “judicial philosophy which has relied on [the due process]
clause” to afford judges “a wide and unbounded power” to strike down laws of
which they disapprove. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 407 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J.,
concurring) (Rochin should be limited to “clear cases of physical coercion and
brutality” because read as a broad principle the decision invites “such uncertainty
and unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell—other than by guesswork—just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home must
be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution. In truth, the
practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are
sufficiently revolted by local police action a conviction is overturned . . . .”).
Justice Clark’s description of Rochin was a hostile characterization of the decision,
not the endorsement of subjective decision-making Justice Black made it out to be.
250. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
251. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
252. Harlan also explained that he did not join Douglas’s opinion of the Court
because it implicitly accepted the dissenters’ mistaken view that the due process
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major points. The first was that Black’s textualism started from a selfcontradiction, his refusal to see that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment stands . . . on its own bottom.”253 Rather than
taking seriously the language of that text, with its broad reference to
“liberty” and its deliberate echo of Magna Carta, the acolyte of text-bound
constitutional decision making invoked the incorporation doctrine, which
made no pretense of being an interpretation of the due process clause’s
words and, Harlan thought, had no plausible claim to an historical
foundation. The result of such a wildly non-text-centered approach was, at
least as applied by the dissenters in Griswold, “to restrict the reach of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process” to a narrower range than the words
indicate, not by legal reasoning but by judicial fiat.254
Harlan went on, second, to respond directly to Black’s repeated
assertions in his dissent that his textualism avoided the dangers of
subjective judicial decision making. The “justification” the dissenters
offered “for their ‘incorporation’ approach to this case” rested “on the
thesis that by limiting the content of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the protection of rights which can be found
elsewhere in the Constitution, in this instance in the Bill of Rights, judges
will thus be confined to ‘interpretation’ of specific constitutional
provisions, and will thereby be restrained from introducing their own
notions of constitutional right and wrong into the ‘vague contours of the
Due Process Clause.’”255 Harlan agreed that judicial willfulness is a
problem but flatly denied that Black was offering the solution.
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial “self
restraint” is an indispensable ingredient of sound
constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the formula
suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real.
“Specific” provisions of the Constitution, no less than “due
process,” lend themselves as readily to “personal”
interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is
simply to keep the Constitution in supposed “tune with the
times.”256
The fundamental objection to Black’s position was not the fact, as
Harlan saw it, that incorporation is a misreading of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s original purpose, but that no “formula” can guarantee
clause is limited to “right[s] assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of the
Rights.” Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
253. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
254. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
255. Id. at 500–01 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
256. Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 522
(Black, J., dissenting)).

136

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 1

judicial self-restraint. Judges wrongly insert their personal preferences into
their constitutional decisions not because they are using the wrong
intellectual tools, but because they are misusing their office.257
The cure for moral failure is moral reform. Harlan offered the same
qualities that he had suggested in Poe are necessary for a judge to engage
properly in due process analysis as themselves the only adequate and
practicable check on wayward constitutional decision making. “Judicial
self-restraint . . . will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional
areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history,
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and
separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms.”258 Unlike textualism, which minimizes or denies the role of
judgment in constitutional law, and thus implicitly portrays those who
disagree with the textualist as inept or acting in bad faith, Harlan
recognized the inescapability of personal judgment and therefore of
intelligent, good faith disagreement in applying the basic charter of our
society. “Adherence to these principles will not, of course, obviate all
constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it.”259 In
Harlan’s view, the conscientious practice of constitutional adjudication as
he understood it, not textualism’s “interpolation into the Constitution of an
artificial and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due Process
Clause,” is the only effective safeguard against lawless constitutional
decisions.260

257. As noted above, Harlan may have been substantially wrong in dismissing
the historical argument for incorporation. Harlan offered the Court’s
reapportionment cases, which he also thought historically indefensible, as a recent
example of policy-driven decisions supposedly resting on textualist premises, an
especially apt example since Black was the author of Wesberry v. Sanders, which
“‘interpreted’ ‘by the People’ (Art. I, § 2) . . . to command ‘one person, one vote.’”
Id. (discussing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)). Harlan thought the
historical arguments he made in his dissent in Wesberry were “irrefutable” and
“unanswered” by Black’s discussion of history. Id. Nothing turns, for present
purposes, on which justice had the better of that disagreement, although it is worth
noting that Harlan’s reading of history seems to have fared better than Black’s in
subsequent commentary. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1064 n.8 (2d ed. 1988); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 135 (1965); Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 253–54 n.186 (1991) (“Justice Black's use of history in Wesberry is
demolished in Justice Harlan's dissent.”).
258. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
259. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
260. See id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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III. THE RATIONAL PROCESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION:
HARLAN IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Justice Harlan has long enjoyed a reputation for the qualities of
craftsmanship and intellectual honesty that I hope the reader is persuaded
are fully on display in his opinions in Poe and Griswold.261 That alone
would be good enough reason to read those opinions and others with great
care and attention to detail, as I have tried to do in sections I and II.262 I also
think Harlan’s opinions have other important lessons to teach twenty-first
century constitutional lawyers, and below I will explain what I think those
are. Before I do, however, we should clear away a potential obstacle to
rehearing Harlan, which I will state in question and answer form. Was
Justice Harlan, especially through his Poe dissent, responsible for Roe v.
Wade? The correct answer is yes . . . and no.263
Although the opinion of the Court in Roe did not mention Poe v.
Ullman, the sense in which Harlan’s dissent stands in the line of opinions
that led to and beyond Roe is straightforward. Justice Stewart identified the
fact in his concurrence in Roe itself, and the Poe dissent played a critical
role in the controlling joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that
modified Roe and, as modified, reaffirmed it.264 But the rationale for giving
a negative answer is equally clear. It is difficult to imagine an opinion that
less resembles Harlan’s painstaking effort in Poe to connect constitutional
purposes and precedents with the precise issue before the Court than the
261. Professor Jesse H. Choper once called Harlan “the finest legal craftsman
ever . . . to sit on the Supreme Court.”Jesse H. Choper, Remarks on Justice Harlan
and the Bill of Rights, 36 N.Y. L. REV. 127 (1991). See also Stuart H. Shiffman,
Tales of Two Harlans, 76 JUDICATURE 319, 319 (1993) (noting that Harlan was a
justice “whom both liberals and conservatives admired and respected as a legal
scholar and ‘judge's judge’”).
262. In discussing the virtue of prudence or judgment that a good judge must
display, Professor Fried remarks that Aristotle thought that “the best means for
teaching and acquiring virtue” is to “study the example of persons who to a high
degree exhibit the virtue,” and proposes his candidates for a list of past judges of
great judgment, “Learned Hand, Robert Jackson, Henry Friendly, and John
Marshall Harlan (the younger).” Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1025, 1041–42 (2011).
263. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
264. See id. at 168, n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing Griswold as
supporting the decision in Roe because “the Griswold decision can be rationally
understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively invaded the
‘liberty’ that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment” and citing in support “Mr. Justice Harlan’s thorough and thoughtful
opinion dissenting from dismissal of the appeal in Poe v. Ullman . . . .”); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–50, 858 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (relying on quotations from Harlan’s Poe
dissent).
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majority opinion in Roe with its nonchalant attitude toward legal reasoning
and the specifics of the case.265
Whatever the success of later efforts to justify “the central holding
of Roe” in part through an “explication of personal liberty” based on the
Poe dissent,266 Roe itself was not an application of the framework of
constitutional principles Harlan described, and he deserves neither credit
nor blame for the decision.267 Of equal importance, in Poe and Griswold,
Harlan was proposing and enacting an approach to constitutional decision
making generally, and his specific approach to due process can only be
understood in the setting of his broader vision. We can and should consider
what Harlan may have to contribute to our constitutional law thinking
without reflexively evaluating his views in the light of our own views about
Roe.
What follows, then, are some lessons for twenty-first century
constitutional lawyers that I think Justice Harlan has to offer, fifty years
after he left the Supreme Court.
A. Constitutional Decision Making Cannot be Reduced to an
Algorithm
Like the other Justices appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Hugo
Black was a reformer, committed to eliminating the abuses they believed
the pre-1937, Lochner-era Court had committed. The fundamental error of
the old Court, as he saw it, was to treat constitutional decision making as
involving the exercise of normative judgment by the judiciary. By
definition, any such judgment requires individual judges to introduce their
own moral and policy perspectives into their decisions. In doing so, the
judges deny, in reality if not verbally, the authority of the written
Constitution and the policy-making role of the legislature. The solution, in
turn, was to restate the process of constitutional adjudication so as to
eliminate any place for personal judgment and limit constitutional judges to
265. The canonical criticism of Roe’s sloppy workmanship is John Hart Ely’s
biting observation that Roe was “a very bad decision . . . because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be.” John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973).
266. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.).
267. I think it likely that Harlan would have dissented in Roe, and he certainly
would not have joined the sweeping trimester scheme, with its almost complete
disconnect from the specific statutes before the Court in Roe and its companion
decision. But I also think that speculation about the judgment that Harlan would
have reached in Roe is beside the point. As we have seen, in Griswold Harlan
expressly acknowledged that judges sharing the framework of constitutional
principles he thought correct can and sometimes will disagree over the correct
result in a particular case.
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the role of interpreting norms entirely defined by the Constitution’s
language or by the legislature.
Black believed that what I have called his textualism achieved this
end and was therefore the correct method of constitutional adjudication for
definitional as well prudential reasons. 268 As a matter of definition, since
the Constitution is a written text, constitutional law is textual interpretation.
“Constitutional cases must be decided according to the terms of our
Constitution.”269 And constraining judges “‘to pass upon the
constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution’ and
thus ‘proceed[] within clearly marked constitutional boundaries . . . to
execute policies written into the Constitution’” eliminates the danger that
they will “‘roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to
reasonableness.’”270 Textualism makes constitutional adjudication
algorithmic.
Harlan thought Black’s position erroneous and indeed indefensible.
This was in part because Harlan believed it clear that textualism does not
achieve the goal of excluding judicial subjectivity from judicial decisions.
Black’s constitutional opinions were no more demonstrably free of the
influence of Black’s personal judgment than anyone else’s.271 Indeed, in his
Griswold concurrence, Harlan suggested that the claim to provide a neutral
and algorithmic method for deriving constitutional decisions may actually
trap the textualist in self-deception. A judge who believes that normative
judgment must be excluded from constitutional decision making will be
unable, if a person of integrity, to recognize the role that such judgments
are unavoidably playing in his or her own decisions.
This is an old and powerful point. As Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged long ago, constitutional lawyers cannot hermetically seal off
their legal opinions from their personal and sometimes conflicting political
and moral beliefs. “The judgment is so much influenced by the wishes, the
268. Black’s textualism served at least one other substantive purpose in his
thinking: it expressed and justified his First Amendment absolutism, a viewpoint
that rested on a sophisticated recognition that effective protection for freedom of
speech must safeguard expression against judicial abridgment as well as invasion
by the legislature or executive. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO
LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF THE ABSOLUTE FIRST
AMENDMENT 246–53 (2009).
269. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 14 (1968). See
also id. at xvi (“[T]he courts should always try faithfully to follow the true meaning
of the Constitution and other laws as actually written . . . .”).
270. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 525–26 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
271. As noted above, Harlan thought Black’s Wesberry one person/one vote
opinion was a particularly egregious example of reading policy preferences into a
constitutional provision that will not bear them.
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affections, and the general theories of those by whom any political
proposition is decided, that a contrariety of opinion on [a] great
constitutional question ought to excite no surprise”272 The path of wisdom
lies in recognizing the part that one’s normative commitments play, not in
pretending they are irrelevant or can be denied a role in deciding a difficult
case. The criticism is also a familiar one. Opponents of Black’s intellectual
heirs regularly point out that the conclusions reached by current day
textualists and originalists coincide with the latter’s apparent policy
preferences with remarkable frequency. On this issue, Harlan’s is only one
more voice in a chorus.
Harlan’s more fundamental critique of Black, and his real
contribution to constitutional thought in the twenty-first century on this
issue, lies elsewhere. Textualism, and indeed any algorithmic understanding
of institutional adjudication, begs the question of how this particular text is
to be read. As Marshall indicated in McCulloch v. Maryland and elsewhere,
much of the time the language of the Constitution does not invite or even
permit decision making by a verbal analysis in which normative judgments
about the Constitution’s purposes and overarching principles play no
role.273 The real Constitution is, in Harlan’s words, the basic charter of our
society and much of the time announces principles of government that must
be applied to particular cases through a process involving the personal
judgment of those who must do the applying.
Accepting Harlan’s view of Black does not entail the conclusion
that Black was wrong to worry that judges, and in particular Justices of the
Supreme Court, may allow their personal preferences to overwhelm or
inadvertently subvert their judgment about the best answer to a
constitutional question. That is an ever-present danger. What does follow is
that the enterprise of looking for an algorithmic or methodological solution
to the problem of improper judicial decision making is wrong-headed. No
amount of tinkering with a list of approved forms of argument can prevent a
272. 4 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 394 (Wm. H.
Wise & Co. 1925) (orig. ed. 1804–07).
273. In discussing the scope of Congress’s power over foreign and interstate
commerce, Marshall wrote that “our constitution being . . . one of enumeration, and
not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle
the meaning of the word,” and proceeded to do so by invoking common English
usage, the reader’s judgment about what a reasonable “system for regulating
commerce” must include, the implications of other constitutional provisions, past
political practice, and “the primary objects for which the people of America
adopted their government.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90
(1824). See also John Marshall, Opinion, A Friend of the Constitution III (July 2,
1819), ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 168 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (stating that
constitutional decisions should conform to “that great paramount law of reason,
which pervades and regulates all human systems”).
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judge from allowing personal inclinations from influencing his or her
constitutional conclusions, inadvertently or otherwise. Despite his
quotations from Frankfurter, Harlan in reality refused to participate in the
long-running argument between Frankfurter and Black over who had the
better approach to constraining constitutional decision making. The
problem of inappropriate judicial subjectivity is moral, not intellectual, and
the only “solution” is to restate and practice constitutional adjudication as
its great exponents have done. A judge whose constitutional decisions are
justified by cogent opinions in the McCulloch tradition, and thus involve
the exercise of personal, normative judgment, is practicing “judicial selfrestraint” in the only sense that is meaningful or necessary.
B. Constitutional Decision Making in the McCulloch Tradition is the
True Path of Fidelity to the Constitution
Recognizing that the negative question “how can we constrain
judges to limit themselves to their proper role?” is wrong-headed puts great
weight on the affirmative description of constitutional decision making we
accept. As the reader knows, Justice Harlan spent much of his Poe dissent
explaining how he understood “the rational process in Constitutional
adjudication,”274 and I believe that renewed attention to his understanding
would greatly benefit twenty-first century constitutional lawyers.
The legitimacy of judicial review stems from the authority of the
written Constitution as supreme law, but in order to respect that authority,
the judge must take account of exactly what kind of text the Constitution is.
“[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”275
Chief Justice Marshall explained in McCulloch that the Constitution’s
“nature . . . requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”276 In
Poe, Harlan paraphrased Marshall’s statement as meaning that “the basis of
judgment” in a constitutional case “must be a rational one, approaching the
text which is the only commission for our power not in a literalistic way, as
if we had a tax statute before us, but as the basic charter of our society,
setting out in spare but meaningful terms the principles of government.”277
Attempts to assimilate constitutional decision making in general to the sort
of clause-bound interpretivism often appropriate in statutory construction

274. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
275. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis
added).
276. Id.
277. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316).
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are mistakes, blatant failures to recall “that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”278
Constitutional adjudication that gives appropriate weight to the
Constitution’s “nature” as “the basic charter of our society” will put great
weight on the “background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been
rationally perceived and historically developed,” that are relevant to the
specific issue the judge must decide.279 Discerning what those purposes are,
both in historical background and as the ongoing tradition of judicial
precedent and political practice has elaborated them, is not a simple matter
of discovering preexisting normative judgments. There is in the process an
ineluctable element of personal judgment, of weighing how persuasive
differing arguments are, and of determining which among conflicting
conclusions is more faithful to principle and precedent. Far from excluding
the exercise of normative judgment, respect for a text such as the
Constitution demands it.280
The flip side of Harlan’s emphasis on constitutional purposes and
principles is his insistence that the rational process in constitutional
adjudication requires judges to define the issue before the court, and thus
the scope of whatever decision the court should render, with great
precision, and take painstaking account of relevant legal authority. In this
regard as in others, Harlan’s approach is the reverse of Black’s textualism,
which generally broke down the Constitution into its textual components
and avoided reliance on considerations that transcend individual provisions.
As Black’s total incorporation theory demonstrates, doing so could lead
278. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 269, at xvi (courts must “follow the true
meaning of the Constitution and other laws as actually written. . . .”).
279. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540, 544. See also id. at 542–43 (“[T]he imperative
character of Constitutional provisions . . . must be discerned from a particular
provision's larger context” which may be “one not of words, but of history and
purposes . . . .”).
280. It would be a misplaced literalism in reading judicial opinions to take
either Marshall or Harlan to deny that the Constitution also includes many
provisions that often should be treated as specific rules more than as broad
principles of government. The age requirements for members of Congress and the
president come to mind. But the decision to treat a given provision as a clausebound rule itself is an exercise of normative judgment (why not read the age
requirements as establishing a broader, and vaguer, principle that elected federal
officials must be mature?). Furthermore, provisions that look on their face like
rules often give rise to questions that can only be answered by making non-rulebound judgments of principle. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128
(1926) (despite the delegation to the president of a textually unlimited power of
appointment, Congress may prescribe qualifications for office “provided of course
that the qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice
as to be in effect legislative designation.”). Finally, it is not the provisions that are
plausible candidates for treatment as rules that generate most constitutional
controversies.
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Black to adopt very far reaching and context free conclusions. In contrast,
as his Poe dissent illustrated, Harlan generally started from a
comprehensive understanding of the constitutional principles at issue but
reasoned his way to a judgment defined by the particular facts of the case
and the relevant precedents. Harlan’s rational process thus pushes
constitutional decisions in the direction of overall coherence, while at the
same time resisting the temptation to issue sweeping pronouncements that
might later seem inconsistent with other constitutional principles.
Harlan’s insistence on precision—in defining the issue before the
Court, in dealing with relevant precedent, and in explaining the rationale for
the resolution he thought correct—often separates his understanding of
constitutional adjudication from Frankfurter’s, although Harlan’s quotations
from Frankfurter in Poe may obscure that fact. Frankfurter’s opinion for the
Court in Rochin v. California can illustrate the difference. Frankfurter
insisted, as Harlan would later do in Poe, that due process adjudication
involves a “judicial exercise of judgment” rather than application of a fixed,
“authoritatively formulated” set of rules.281 At the same time, he wrote at
great length to insist that the justices could “not draw on our
merely personal and private notions” in deciding whether subjecting a
criminal suspect to involuntary stomach-pumping violates due process.282
But despite Frankfurter’s insistence that his discussion of that question was
“a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science,” his Rochin opinion
relied almost entirely on general references to “standards of justice” rather
than the careful, step-by-step discussion of constitutional principles and
precedents that pervades Harlan’s dissent in Poe.283
Harlan would have accepted many, or perhaps even all of
Frankfurter’s generalizations as characterizations of the due process
tradition’s goal of preventing oppression and tyranny, or as ways of
appealing to the reader’s personal sense of what makes sense in light of the
tradition. But in Rochin, the generalizations almost entirely displace the
discussion of principle and precedent Harlan thought essential, leaving
Frankurter’s famous line “[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience”
suspiciously close to an affirmation of personal morality rather than a
281. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171, 169 (1952). Cf. Poe, 367 U.S at
542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code.”).
282. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170).
283. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 169. See also id. at 169 (“[C]anons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . . .
personal immunities which . . . are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ . . . or are ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty’”); id. at 173 (“[C]ertain decencies of civilized conduct . . .
convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend ‘a sense of justice’ . . .
the community’s sense of fair play and decency.”); id. at 174 (“so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity”).
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conclusion of constitutional law.284 Harlan and Frankfurter both rejected
Black’s algorithmic mindset, and in a broad sense agreed on the inevitable
role of normative judgment in constitutional adjudication, but Harlan
respected a fundamental principle that Frankfurter in Rochin and elsewhere
too often forgot. To be legitimate, “determinations of law emerge from
working with texts that are common and public” rather than from private
convictions about justice or generalities about civilized behavior.285 This
difference in practice in their understandings of personal judgment is so
great as to be a matter of kind and not just of degree.286
The proper and, as Harlan believed, traditional approach to
constitutional decision does not preclude error or generate inescapably
correct outcomes in difficult cases. Different judges will sometimes come
to different conclusions without anyone having acted improperly or beyond
the legitimate scope of the judicial office. Constitutional law is not
Euclidean geometry, and the lawyers and judges who must ask and answer
constitutional questions are human beings rather than computer programs.
Their judgments will reflect these truths. But this is not a flaw. The
assumption that recognizing a role for personal judgment necessarily opens
the door to willful judicial subjectivity assumes a grimmer view of the
human ability to act with integrity and on principle than we need admit.287
The devotees of algorithmic approaches to constitutional law share with
their archenemies, the proponents of an ideologically defined “living
Constitution,” the underlying assumption that the individual judge’s
personal commitments must either rule or play no role whatsoever. Harlan,
in his description of constitutional adjudication and in his practice in Poe, is
proof that the assumption is erroneous.
C. Constitutional Law is an Ongoing Dialogue
Precisely because they are intended to eliminate the role of personal
judgment and normative reasoning from constitutional law, algorithmic
understandings of constitutional adjudication are intrinsically nondialogical.288 Intelligent adherents such as Justice Black recognize that there
284. Id. at 172. On the role of appeals to legally shaped, common-sense
opinion, see supra at notes 188–90.
285. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP 107 (1995).
286. I owe this point to Henry Monaghan.
287. “The use of rules to coordinate human enterprises of every sort assumes a
generous and honest attitude . . . intelligence and good faith [and] that is a strength,
not a weakness . . . .” CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 67 (1991). Fried goes on to say about what
I have labeled algorithmic views of constitutional adjudication that they rest on
“too grim a view of human nature and of human intelligence.” Id.
288. The same is true, I think, of views of a “living Constitution” that reduce
constitutional law to the judicial enactment of an ideology. In what follows,
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can be difficult questions and good faith disagreements,289 but the ideal case
is the constitutional issue for which the algorithm, properly followed,
produces an incontrovertibly correct resolution. Constitutional adjudication
is, at heart, an inquiry into facts, and those who dispute the facts have
nothing to teach the better informed.290
In principle, the technique eliminates the need for discussion,
which is central to the popularity of algorithmic arguments.291 This is part
of the reason the adherents to algorithmic views are generally impatient
with stare decisis. Even if they concede that there are at times adequate
prudential reasons for respecting a particular precedent, they do not
understand precedents themselves to contribute to our understanding of “the
imperative character of Constitutional provisions,” as Justice Harlan
thought.292 At most, a precedent registers correctly the meaning derived
through the algorithm and provides an example of its application to a
factual situation. There is no strong sense in which a constitutional judge, at
least if he or she sits on the Supreme Court, owes any particular duty to, or
can derive any particular benefit from, the past course of constitutional
adjudication.293
virtually everything I say about algorithmic approaches applies with equal force to
ideological ones, the only change being that the role of the indisputable answer
generated by the unquestionable method is played by the indisputable answer
generated by the unquestionable moral and political theory.
289. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1986 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]here is room for honest disagreement, even as we
endeavor to find the correct answer. . . . Reasonable jurists can apply traditional
tools of construction and arrive at different interpretations of legal texts.”).
290. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing “lawyers’ work” in
constitutional law as “reading text and discerning our society's traditional
understanding of that text. . . . Texts and traditions are facts to study, not . . . [a]
process . . . of making value judgments . . . .”).
291. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 186 (1991) (“It
is the illusion of our Age, to which we relentlessly cling, that men and women can
create tools to solve moral and political problems, much as we have created
technologies that solve physical problems.”).
292. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
293. The qualification is necessary because most adherents to an algorithmic
account of constitutional law assume that lower court judges are obliged to follow
Supreme Court decisions even if the judge concludes that a decision is
“demonstrably incorrect.” Compare Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1989 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[W]e should not invoke stare decisis to uphold precedents that are
demonstrably erroneous . . . .”) with id. at 1982 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
make no claim about any obligation of “inferior” federal courts . . . or state courts
to follow Supreme Court precedent.”). As Henry Paul Monaghan pointed out in his
classic article on constitutional precedent, the problem with a formulation such as
Justice Thomas’s “demonstrably incorrect” is that “”[w]hether a precedent is seen
as clearly wrong is often a function of the judge’s self-confidence more than of any
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The principled refusal of adherents to algorithmic constitutional
adjudication to accept the substantive value of engagement with precedent
is a striking departure from traditional practice. The traditional view
recognized the importance of taking the reasoning of past decisions into
account, and gave special attention to opinions and opinion-writers
generally thought to display good judgment.294 And it is squarely contrary
to the example Harlan gave in his Poe and Griswold opinions. In the Poe
dissent, as we have seen, Harlan put great weight on the judge’s obligation,
in a constitutional case presenting novel or difficult claims, to situate his
analysis in the ongoing tradition of constitutional adjudication, both in his
description of due process analysis and in his careful use of precedent in
addressing the merits of the appellants’ claim. A lasting decision “builds on
what has survived” in the tradition, and the “decision of an apparently novel
claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted
principles and criteria. The new decision must take ‘its place in relation to
what went before.’”295
For Harlan, constitutional thought is intrinsically a dialogue
between the judge and the authorities, the present and the past. And it is
equally a dialogue between the judge and his or her colleagues and critics,
on and off the bench. Careful consideration of what past judges have
thought about constitutional questions is itself a means of deepening one’s
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution quite apart from technical
stare decisis concerns.296 The same is true about the views of the judge’s
objective fact.” Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication (1988), reprinted in
Monaghan, American Constitutional Law: Selected Essays 532-33 (2018).
294. This traditional recognition of precedent as a source of wisdom is
displayed in ways large and small, including (for example) the frequent, technically
unnecessary indication in a citation that an opinion was written by a judge
esteemed for good judgment. Even staunch supporters of algorithmic thinking
continue this practice. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 (1804)
(Marshall, C.J.); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 548 (1891) (Holmes, J.))
(parallel citations omitted).
295. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542, 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
296. Harlan accepted, of course, the legitimacy of the Court overruling
precedent – the exercise of the power to overrule, after all, is itself part of the
constitutional tradition and ratified by precedent. But he was slow to disregard even
precedents he thought grievously wrong. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 98 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Because judicial responsibility requires me,
as I see things, to bow to the authority of Reynolds v. Simms, despite my original
and continuing belief that the decision was constitutionally wrong, I feel compelled
to concur in the Court's disposition of this case.”) (citations omitted). Professor
Monaghan has suggested to me that Harlan’s separate opinion in Oregon v.
Mitchell indicates that he believed precedent demonstrably in conflict with a
constitutional provision’s original meaning is particularly open to being overruled
rather than distinguished. It should also be noted that Harlan thought it much harder
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contemporaries who disagree on matters of substance. Harlan’s
understanding of due process was shaped, in part, by his careful
consideration and rejection of Black’s perspective. There is no formula, no
code of right answers, no mechanical yard-stick for evaluating arguments,
and no escape from the necessity in hard cases to make personal, normative
judgments. There is only an ongoing conversation in which the individual
participant’s role is both to speak and to listen.
In his Griswold concurrence, Harlan explained to his reader the
corollary to his understanding of constitutional adjudication as an ongoing
conversation, extended over time, in which individual normative judgments
about the issues discussed inevitably play a role. Disagreement among
those who must decide constitutional questions cannot be eliminated, even
in principle, and the desire of the devotees of algorithmic or ideological
constitutional decision making to do so is a mistake. “Adherence to these
principles will not, of course, obviate all constitutional differences of
opinion among judges, nor should it.”297 As long as the participants
continue to speak and listen, their inevitable disagreements are the very
means by which this tradition of dialogue lives.298
Harlan’s relationship with Black displays the value of
understanding constitutional law as a conversation.299 Harlan sharply and
to reach the necessary level of clarity about historical meaning than many
contemporary originalists do, and that Harlan’s specific claim in Mitchell was that
he did not need to extend the rationale of the Reynolds line of precedent to control a
related but novel question. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 200, 219 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The history of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suffrage qualifications is remarkably free of
the problems which bedevil most attempts to find a reliable guide to present
decision in the pages of the past. Instead, there is virtually unanimous agreement,
clearly and repeatedly expressed, that § 1 of the Amendment did not reach
discriminatory voter qualifications. In this rather remarkable situation . . . I am
satisfied that I am free to decide these cases unshackled by a line of decisions
which I have felt from the start entailed a basic departure from sound constitutional
principle.”). See also id. at 152 (Harlan stating that the historical “‘Stop’ sign . . .
compels” the Court not to “allow those decisions [invalidating state legislation] to
carry us to the point of sanctioning Congress’ decision to alter state-determined
voter qualifications by simple legislation . . . .”).
297. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). See also Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(the constitutional “tradition is a living thing”).
298. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
260 (3d ed. 2007) (“[A] tradition is sustained and advanced by its own internal
arguments and conflicts.”).
299. Harlan and Black were warm personal friends, which did not prevent
either from expressing intellectual disagreement in strong terms. See TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN
COURT 136–39 (1992). But there is in their opinions an underlying civility and
respect that is all too often missing in contemporary constitutional disagreements.
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systematically disagreed with Black’s textualist understanding of
constitutional adjudication, both theoretically—Harlan thought Black was
wrong about the implications of the Constitution’s existence as a text—and
in practice. But as the reader knows, Harlan worked out his own position, as
articulated in Poe and Griswold, largely through rebutting Black’s
arguments. Black, in other words, was essential to Harlan. And their
intellectual conflict can continue to enrich constitutional thought. Fifty
years after they left the Court, Black’s forceful claim that Harlan’s
approach necessarily devolves into subjective decision making continues to
be the central challenge to anyone, including the present writer, who
substantially agrees with Harlan.
It is unclear to me if American judges and lawyers in the early
twenty-first century are capable of sustaining this tradition. Our divisions
are so deep, and so rooted in far-reaching ideological conflicts, that they
often overwhelm any sense that those who disagree with us can be anything
but enemies, at least when we are discussing constitutional issues. Perhaps
the most important thing Harlan has to teach us, fifty years after he left the
Court, is the possibility and vital importance of regaining our sense that the
practice of American constitutional law can unite those who disagree, not
simply determine winners and losers in political wars.

See H. Jefferson Powell, Judges as Superheroes: The Danger of Confusing
Constitutional Decisions with Cosmic Battles, 72 S.C. L. REV. 917 (2021).

